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Summary 
Diverging narratives of the Cold War have laid the ground for diverg-
ing approaches to Russia on both sides of the Atlantic. Germany’s 
Russia policy has pragmatic, material and ideological aspects; a key 
component is the country’s long history of trade and exchange with 
Russia. Germany’s interest in and tradition of cooperation with Russia 
has pre-war roots and serves multiple interests. Even today, and de-
spite some latent tensions between values and interests, Germany feels 
it has a special role to play in anchoring Russia to the West. In addi-
tion, Germany’s high standing and Russia’s positive narrative of its 
old enemy contrast favourably with dominant perceptions in countries 
otherwise closer to Germany. This complex backdrop has paved the 
way for a partnership that assumed more institutionalised forms dur-
ing Gerhard Schröder’s term as chancellor, but has otherwise re-
mained largely instrumental, particularly since Angela Merkel took 
over in 2005. 
 
During Merkel’s term, the sobered relationship has highlighted the 
heavy economic core of the Russo–German relationship. Since well 
before the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has been Germany’s prima-
ry source of oil and gas imports. This long-standing relationship has 
fostered a nationally defined energy policy which sometimes puts 
Germany at odds with the wider EU agenda. Not only do Russian ex-
ports of raw materials shape economic relations, they have also pro-
vided Germany with valuable security policy lessons. Russia has al-
ways been a reliable exporter for Germany; in turn, Germany has 
largely opposed undue securitisation of energy policy, as called for by 
the USA or by other EU countries.  
 
German reunification was made possible by Russia, and Germany 
does not intend to be drawn into a new Cold War under any circum-
stances. However, reconciling transatlantic commitments with over-
tures to Russia has remained a constant challenge. Germany advocated 
NATO expansion in the 1990s as a means to achieve stability in Eu-
rope, but has also repeatedly defended Russian interests inside the or-
ganisation. The Russian–Georgian war in 2008, a delicate test case 
that required a balancing act for German diplomacy, contributed to 
cementing a pragmatic Russia policy. While staying loyal to NATO, 
Germany remains committed to the daunting long-term task of includ-
ing Russia in a future European security architecture. Combining col-
lective security within NATO with the quest for ‘cooperative security’ 
with Russia remains a seemingly ambiguous policy, but it suits Ger-
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man interests. Although NATO’s Russia policy can obviously not be 
shaped against the will of Germany, there are still clear limits to the 
weight that Germany can carry in ‘hard security’ questions. Ultimate-
ly, Germany serves as a moderating element in international politics, 
and could very well be the best guarantee that any talk of a new Cold 
War with Russia will not escalate from rhetoric to reality.  
 
 
  
   
 
The secret of politics? Make a good treaty with Russia 
– Otto von Bismarck 
 
Introduction 
During the two decades after 1990, Germany and Europe underwent 
tremendous changes. After German reunification and the eastward ex-
pansion of the EU and NATO, Germany went from being the eastern 
rim of the transatlantic community to centre-stage in Europe, geo-
graphically and in terms of political influence. 
 
If anything has re-emerged of the old European order, it is sensitivity 
to any real or perceived German great-power ambitions. Indeed, some 
of those who make it their business to analyse foreign policy tend to 
magnify the implications of German decisions out of all proportion. 
Shortly after reunification, Germany’s unilateral recognition of the 
breakaway former Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and Croatia 
sparked fears in some circles that German reunification could pave the 
way for a renewal of German Machtpolitik.1 These fears were dis-
pelled rather quickly. Today, in connection with Germany’s Russia 
policy and together with the increasing perceptions of declining US 
influence in Europe, such worries are heard mainly in the United 
States and in parts of Eastern Europe.2  
 
This discussion has emerged at a time of US ‘imperial overstretch’ 
and waning interest in Europe. Barack Obama has sometimes been 
labelled the first non-European US president.3 This renewed question-
ing of Germany’s role in Europe also comes at a time when the 
Obama re-set in Russian–US relations has been grinding to a standstill 
and retired members of the US foreign policy establishment such as 
Robert Gates, William Cohen and Nicholas Burns publicly question 
the value of NATO. In addition, Germany, once a ‘pillar of NATO’, is 
increasingly perceived as a ‘weak link’, with departing US Defense 
Secretary Gates warning that the alliance could slip into ‘military ir-
relevance’ unless the European allies were willing to commit greater 
                                                 
1  For a French perspective, see, for example, Alain Griotteray and Jean de Larsan. 1999. 
Voyage au bout de l'Allemagne (Editions du Rocher);or Yvonne Bollmann, 1998, La ten-
tation allemande (Ed. Michalon). 
2  The management of the euro-crisis is not the subject of this report. 
3  The context bears a resemblance to the situation at the end of the Vietnam War. The USA 
was in a position of relative weakness and Germany had just initiated its Ostpolitik, the 
policy of détente and overtures to the Eastern Bloc. As we shall see, today’s discussion 
has many historical parallels. 
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resources. While such calls are not new – they echo Cold War-era 
calls for ‘sharing the burden’– Germany was among the countries ex-
plicitly named by Gates.4 
 
Germany’s abstention during the UN Security Council vote on Libya, 
whereby it effectively sided with the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, 
India and China) against France and the USA, broke an unwritten rule 
of Germany’s NATO membership: never side against both France and 
the USA (another unwritten rule, not to side with France against the 
USA, was broken in 2003). Spurred by an alarmist press and critics 
prone to crisis-maximisation, the German vote conjured up renewed 
suspicions of a German Sonderweg and of a ‘national-pacifist’ third 
way. The situation brought grist to the mill and new topicality to the 
question once posed by Richard Holbrooke, former US ambassador to 
Germany: ‘How come Germans have this reputation of being reliable 
[as a NATO ally], when they never quite are, and historically maybe 
never were?’5 
 
Even though subsequent German fence-mending went a long way in 
relativising these interpretations, German Foreign Minister Wester-
welle himself came under strong criticism, also from within his own 
party. It is noteworthy that the only significant appearance of Germa-
ny’s NATO ambassador after the Libya vote in the UNSC was in the 
NATO–Russia Council, when he went to considerable lengths to ex-
press his support for the ongoing NATO operation. Germany’s diplo-
mats must have felt it necessary to give a public demonstration that 
the country was not siding with Russia. 
 
A sign of the times: during her state visit to the United States, Chan-
cellor Angela Merkel was awarded the prestigious presidential Medal 
of Freedom. That decision had been made long before the rift over 
Libya, and the award ceremony came at an awkward moment for both 
parties. Still, the ceremony did not fail to deliver a highly symbolic 
message: with the USA engaged in a process of gradual and relative 
strategic withdrawal from Europe, Germany will have to bear greater 
responsibility for the continent. Of course, Washington would like 
Merkel to assume this responsibility in a transatlantic spirit. 
 
In order to assess the perceived German challenge to Atlanticism and 
evaluate the lessons to be drawn from Russo–German co-operation, 
several think-tanks on both sides of the Atlantic started taking an in-
                                                 
4  ‘Gates criticises five allies over Libya’, FT, 8 June 2011. 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/042c1152-91ee-11e0-b8c1-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1VBjcBQK9 (accessed 1 June 2013) 
5  ‘Awkward moment for Obama and Merkel’, NYT, 2 May 2011. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/03/world/europe/03iht-politicus03.html (accessed 1 
June 2013) 
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creased interest in the question.6 After the Russian–Georgian war in 
August 2008, it was very easy to find alarmist publicists in the USA 
ready to denounce a ‘Russo–German plan to dismantle NATO’.7  
 
Edward Lucas, Central and Eastern European correspondent for The 
Economist and author of a best-seller on an alleged ‘new Cold War’8 
between Russia and the West, has summed up the weight of the accu-
sations levelled by Germany’s critics:  
 
Germany’s relationship with Vladimir Putin’s Russia is the most puzzling and 
troubling feature of modern European politics: not only is Germany Russia’s 
biggest trading partner, it is also her biggest ally. It is Germany that has derailed 
NATO expansion. Germany reversed the EU’s initially tough line on Russia af-
ter the invasion of Georgia. Germany prevents the Council of Europe scrutinis-
ing Russia’s flawed elections.9 
 
More soberly, to Stephen Szabo, executive director of the Transatlan-
tic Academy, ‘there is a real danger that without a common approach 
(between the USA and Germany), the latter could increasingly play 
the role of mediator between Russia and the United States’.10 This 
might be exactly the role Germany seeks to endorse.  
 
Seen from a long-term historical perspective, every new chapter of 
post-war European history is a ritual re-launching of an old debate, 
with every wave of fresh accusations that Germany is drifting towards 
Russia met by German reassurances of its continued anchoring in the 
West. As far back as the days of the ‘Stalin note’ – the Soviet leader’s 
famous proposal for a reunified and neutral Germany – alarmist voices 
wary of the ‘finlandization’ of Germany or, alternatively, of a new 
Rapallo Treaty have been heard on both sides of the Atlantic.  
 
Willy Brandt, Chancellor from 1969 to 1974 and mastermind of Ost-
politik, the politics of détente and overtures to the Communist bloc, 
assured his detractors: ‘Ostpolitik is Westpolitik’. Later, Helmut 
Kohl’s long-serving foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher famous-
ly explained there was no such thing as a German national interest, 
                                                 
6  See, for example, Ingo Mannteufel, ‘Germany is deeply divided on how to deal with Rus-
sia’. Atlantic-Community.org, 20 July 2011.http://www.atlantic-community.org/ index/ 
articles/view/Germany_is_Deeply_Divided_on_How_to_Deal_with_Russia (accessed 1 
June 2013) 
7  The chief editor of the evangelical political magazine The Trumpet believes that Germany 
and Russia conspired to attack Georgia: Brad Macdonald, ‘The Russo-German plan to 
dismantle NATO’, Thetrumpet.com, 16 October 2008. 
http://www.thetrumpet.com/?q=5598.3914.0.0 (accessed 1 June 2013) Similar conspiracy 
theories abound. 
8  Edward Lucas, 2008, The New Cold War. London: Bloomsbury. 
9  Edward Lucas, ‘Bearhugged by Uncle Vlad’, Standpoint.co.uk, Bearhugged by Uncle 
Vlad. http://standpointmag.co.uk/bearhugged-by-uncle-vlad-january-09 (accessed 1 June 
2013) 
10  Stephen F.Szabo, 2009, ‘Can Washington and Berlin agree on Russia?’ The Washington 
Quarterly, 32(4): 23–41. 
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because ‘German national interest is European interests’. During his 
milestone January 1990 speech in Tutzing, on the eve of German reu-
nification, Genscher gave formal reassurances that there would be no 
‘neutralist united Germany’ (Gesamtdeutschland) outside of NATO.11 
In 1998, in his farewell speech to the German Parliament, the coun-
try’s longest-serving foreign minister delivered a profession of faith, a 
résumé of Germany’s historical experience at the close of the 20th 
century: ‘For us, the anchoring of Germany in the Western value 
community through participation in the European unification and in 
the Atlantic Alliance with the United States remains a lasting founda-
tion of German politics. It is an irreversible positioning of our coun-
try.’12 The latest in this series of reassurances came from Guido West-
erwelle in his maiden speech as foreign minister: ‘Outside of Europe 
the United States is our strongest, but also our most loyal ally.’13  
 
Despite these repeated reassurances, Germany’s transatlantic creden-
tials – its NATO and EU commitments – are still regularly subjected 
to scrutiny. US scepticism towards Germany’s transatlantic credentials 
is echoed by the scepticism of Western European elites towards Ger-
many’s EU commitments. At the same time, despite improvements in 
recent years, Eastern European apprehensions over Germany’s Russia 
policy are easily re-awakened. All this notwithstanding, in his maiden 
speech as foreign minister, Guido Westerwelle decided to congratulate 
German diplomats that ‘today more than ever, the old suspicion that 
Germany is pursuing a Russia policy over the heads of its direct 
neighbours and other partners has been overcome’, adding that ‘an 
effective tool for better embedding of our Russia policy is the trilateral 
cooperation between Germany, Poland and Russia.’14 
 
Greater political demands are being made on Germany at all levels. 
With the on-going euro-crisis, bilateral French–German summits and 
initiatives have multiplied. German–Russian political initiatives seem 
more difficult to accept, at least unless they include other countries as 
well. Germany’s ability to shape the Russia policy of the EU depends 
on the country’s capacity to build consensus within the EU and the 
broader transatlantic community. And between Russia, Eastern Eu-
rope and the USA, Germany is indeed walking a tight rope. 
                                                 
11  At the same time, Genscher ‘unequivocally’ vowed that there would be ‘no Eastward 
expansion of NATO towards the borders of the Soviet Union’. See, for example, Stephen 
F. Szabo, 1992, The Diplomacy of German Unification. New York: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 
57–58  
12  Plenarprotokoll 13/230, 23 April 1998, Deutscher Bundestag, 230 Sitzung. Bonn. 
http://www.genscher.de/16843.html (accessed 1 June 2013) 
13  ‘Deutsche Aussenpolitik ist Friedenspolitik’, Tagesanzeiger.ch, 10 November 2009. 
http://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/ausland/europa/Deutsche-Aussenpolitik-ist-Friedenspolitik/ 
story/27067511 (accessed 1 June 2013) 
14  Guido Westerwelle, ‘Grundsatzrede bei der deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtigen Poli-
tik’, 21 October 2010. Berlin. http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/AktuelleArtikel/101021-BM-dgap-grundsatzrede_node.html 
(accessed 1 June 2013) 
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Germany has a long history of relations with Russia. As a country that 
successfully handled the transition to democracy and reconciled itself 
with the loss of one third of its pre-war territory, Germany sees itself 
as having a special role to play. In the words of one German parlia-
mentarian, ‘If Germany is to have a foreign policy, then it must be di-
rected towards Russia.’15 
 
Analysing Germany’s Russia policy can shed light on a decisive struc-
turing element of contemporary European politics, and provide an-
swers to those seeking signs of a strategic culture in Germany. Delv-
ing into Germany’s Russia policy is also an invitation to explore Ger-
many’s evolving self-understanding in recent decades.  
   
                                                 
15  Author’s interview with Dr Rolf Mützenich, MP (SPD). Berlin, Bundestag, 20 July 2011.  
Reasons for a partnership 
A specific approach to Russia 
Germany’s approach to Russia differs from that of both the USA and 
Eastern Europe. This is grounded in diverging narratives of the Cold 
War, different strategic cultures and different interests. 
 
Europe and the USA drew different lessons from the Cold War, and 
this continues to shape contemporary thinking. The correspondent of 
the Süddeutsche Zeitung recalls a heated discussion in 2007 between 
US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and German Foreign Minister 
Frank-Walter Steinmeier on the origins of the fall of the Soviet Union: 
‘Steinmeier, the Social Democrat, explained it (the fall of the Soviet 
Union) was the consequence of Western détente policies. Rice, the 
Republican, interpreted the fall of the USSR as a fruit of Western in-
transigence.’16 The spokesperson of the victorious superpower paid 
homage to Reagan’s ‘peace through strength’ strategy, whereas the 
representative of the formerly divided front-line state praised Willy 
Brandt’s ‘change through rapprochement’.17 
 
US views on Russia might matter less to Berlin today than they did to 
Bonn. In the closing days of the Cold War, the Treaty on Convention-
al Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Intermediate-Range Nucle-
ar Forces Treaty (INF) were major issues of  times. Nowadays, re-
gardless of their final outcome, the stalled US–Russian talks on nucle-
ar weapons and missile defence will not come close to having the 
same resonance and leverage as the Reykjavik Summit had in 1987. 
Bluntly put, Germany will favour and accept any solution negotiated 
between the USA and Russia – but the absence of a negotiated settle-
ment is unlikely to have an adverse effect on German relations with 
Russia. 
 
Whereas Germany sees the threat emanating from military arsenals as 
a question of perceptions, the USA and Russia still assess the threat 
                                                 
16  Daniel Brössler,‘Zu besuch im Aufbruch’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 5 February 2009. 
17  Originally coined in 1963 by Egon Bahr, the term ‘change through rapprochement’ or  
‘Wandel durch Annäherung’ became the leitmotiv of  German Ostpolitik in Willy 
Brandt’s years as Chancellor (1969–1974). According to Timothy Garton Ash, when the 
question of the reasons for the end of the Cold War was put to veteran Soviet diplomat 
Valentin Falin, he replied: ‘without Ostpolitik, no Gorbachev’(Timothy Garton Ash, 
1993, In Europe's name: Germany and the Divided Continent. New York: Random 
House). But in another interview with the Hamburg weekly Die Zeit, Falin also said that 
the West had arms-raced the Soviets to death. (See Gordon A. Craig,1994, ‘Did Ostpolitik 
Work?’ Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 1994. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ 
49450/gordon-a-craig/did-ostpolitik-work (accessed 1 June 2013) 
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largely in terms of capacities. As long as the US–Russian relationship 
is conceived in terms of nuclear warheads and (re)negotiation of Cold 
War-era treaties, it runs the risk of becoming increasingly irrelevant to 
Berlin.  
 
Besides the importance of history, there is a second, more prosaic rea-
son for the deep-rooted difference in appreciations: whereas the vol-
ume of US–Russian trade remains negligible, Russia’s trade with 
Germany is the most important to Russia. This state of affairs leads 
Washington to view Russia primarily through a geopolitical lens, 
whereas Berlin sees its Eastern neighbour through the prism of geo-
economics.   
Russia and German geo-economics 
Germany’s self-understanding in world affairs is determined by two 
currents: on the one hand, as stated both in the Red/Green coalition 
agreement of 1998 and by the current Liberal foreign minister, ‘Ger-
man foreign policy is peace policy’.18 But Germany is also a trading 
nation: indeed, the world’s largest exporter from 2003 until 2009, 
when it was overtaken by China. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s 
Agenda 2010,19 a controversial series of liberal labour-market reforms 
launched in 2003, explicitly stated the objective of becoming the 
world’s leading exporter, and has been the source of considerable 
pride.  
 
Since the export-driven German economy is dependent on imported 
raw materials, it is in connection with securing these resources that 
any signs of German Realpolitik should be sought. The ill-fated for-
mer federal president Horst Köhler was forced to resign amidst a 
storm of indignation after he stated in a radio interview in 2009:  
 
a country of our size with this export orientation and thereby also export depend-
ency must also know that in doubt, in emergency cases, military operations are 
also necessary to protect our interests, for example free trade routes, for example 
(to prevent) the instability of whole regions, certain to have a negative impact on 
our chances of securing employment and revenues through trade.20 
  
Less than a year later, then-Minister of Defence Karl-Theodor zu Gut-
tenberg proved that Köhler had simply been the expiatory victim of a 
taboo break. At the Berlin security conference, Guttenberg asked 
‘what was so wayward about this (Köhler's) thesis’ and went on to 
                                                 
18  See ‘Deutsche Aussenpolitik ist Friedenspolitik’, note above. 
19  Bundesregierung, 2003,. Agenda 2010: Deutschland bewegt sich. Presse- und Informati-
onsamt der Bundesregierung. Berlin. 
http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/artikel/81/557981/attachment/557980_0.pdf (accessed 1 
June 2013) 
20  Interview with Horst Köhler, Dradio.de, 22 May 2010 
http://www.dradio.de/aktuell/1191138/ (accessed 1 June 2013) 
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add: ‘the emerging powers’ need for raw materials is constantly on the 
rise and thereby enters into competition with our needs. That raises 
questions for our security, which are of strategic importance.’21  
 
During the Cold War, German trade flows and the nexus of political 
and security alliances were largely overlapping, but this picture is 
changing rapidly. As noted by The New York Times, ‘Germany has 
long sat at the centre of  the European economy, but Europe is no 
longer as central to Germany as it used to be […] The shift in focus, 
while still in its early stages, could have profound economic and polit-
ical implications (…)’.22At the annual ambassadors’ conference in late 
August 2011, the embattled German Foreign Minister Westerwelle 
explained, ‘Germany cultivates its proven partnerships, but will find 
more with the emerging power centres of the world [meaning China, 
Russia and others]: That is no rupture with tradition, but mandatory 
development in a changing world.’23 
 
Intra-EU trade still makes up almost 60% of German trade, but its 
principal growth and investment markets are now to be found else-
where. China is the most important of these, but Russia holds a very 
honourable position as Germany’s 11th biggest trade partner in 2010, 
up from 16th position in 1995, and now ranks 13th as regards German 
exports and 10th for German imports. In 2010, trade with Russia 
amounted to only 3.9% of total German  imports and 2.7% of ex-
ports,24 but this still made Russia Germany’s third main trading part-
ner outside the EU (after the USA and China). Seen from the other 
side of the fence, Germany is Russia’s prime trading partner, with 
China a close second. However, there is also a significant trend to-
wards lessening importance of traditional trading partners. During the 
same period, Norway was the only country in Western Europe (i.e. the 
EU-15 plus Switzerland, Norway and Iceland) to experience an in-
crease in the relative importance of its trade with Germany, and that 
was due exclusively to exports of hydrocarbons. From 1995 to 2008, 
the EU-15’s share of total German exports fell from 58.2% to 51.4%. 
                                                 
21  ‘Guttenberg will Wirtschaft militärisch absichern’ , Handelsblatt.com, 9 November 2010. 
http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/guttenberg-will-wirtschaft-militaerisch-
absichern/3632270.html (accessed 1 June 2013) 
22  ‘Europe’s Economic Powerhouse drifts East’, NYTimes.com, 18 July 2011. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/19/business/global/Germany-Europes-Powerhouse-
Drifts-East.html?pagewanted=all (accessed 1 June 2013) 
23  ‘Ein fortschreitender Machtverfall’, FAZ.net, 30 August 2011. 
http://www.faz.net/artikel/C30190/aussenminister-guido-westerwelle-ein-
fortschreitender-machtverfall-30493557.html (accessed 1 June 2013) 
24  It can be interesting to see these figures in a relative perspective, by comparing with 1932 
at the height of inter-war Russo–German economic cooperation: then German trade with 
Russia represented 11% of German exports and 6% of imports, at the time second only to 
trade with the Netherlands, which has remained Germany’s biggest trading partner. This 
relativises the tenants of a Rapallo scenario, but also reminds us of the huge untapped 
growth potential. See Commandant Korzetz, ‘Les relations germano-russes dans le cadre 
des relations UE-Russie’, Diploweb.com, 2 August 2010. http://www.diploweb.com/Les-
relations-germano-russes-dans.html (accessed 1 June 2013) 
18 Victor Waldemar Jensen 
The total volume of German trade with the USA is generally stable, 
but with a growing disequilibrium in Germany’s favour.   
 
In reading these figures, we should recall that German economic 
growth in recent decades has been almost exclusively export-driven, 
with the share of exported goods in relation to total GDP a staggering 
40.1% in 2008, up from 22.3% in 1990. This is comparable to the 
growth of Chinese export dependency in the same period (89% vs. 
79% for Germany, bearing in mind that intra-German trade grew sub-
stantially in the first years after reunification), and puts Germany in a 
totally different category than any other major developed economy 
(for France, the total growth of export dependency over the same peri-
od was 22.4%). The share of Germany’s trade surplus in relation to 
total GNP has also grown, from 0.7% to 7.1%.25  
 
It could be argued that Germany’s eastward pursuit of economic inter-
ests follows a certain path dependency. Indeed, the history of its post-
war political relations with the Soviet Union is closely linked to the 
influential Committee on Eastern European Economic Relations 
(Ostausschuss der deutschen Wirtschaft). The Ostausschuss was 
founded in 1952 at the behest of Ludwig Erhard, the iconic post-war 
Minister of Economy. Drawing on pre-war roots, this is the oldest re-
gional business initiative in Germany. In 1979, Otto Wolff von Amer-
rongen, its first chairman, wrote: ‘For Erhard, the specific reason for 
the establishment of such a body was to fill a political vacuum, be-
cause the Federal Republic had no diplomatic relations with the coun-
tries of the so-called Eastern Bloc.’26 Thus, even before 1955 and the 
resumption of formal relations between West Germany and the Soviet 
Union, business interests stood in a symbiotic relationship with poli-
tics.27  
 
Germany’s policy of openness towards Russia has remained a con-
stant factor over the past two decades. If we accept geo-economics as 
the fundamental premise of its foreign policy, and assume that the 
Germany will maintain its current economic model, the importance of 
its Russia policy is not likely to decrease. 
                                                 
25  Figures and calculations from Statistiches Bundesamt, www.destatis.de and Bundesmini-
sterium für Wirtschaft, www.bmwi.de (accessed 1 June 2013)  
26  Otto Wolff von Amerongen, ‘Aussenwirtschaft und Aussenpolitik’, Osteuropa, May 
1979, pp. 3–12 
27  This symbiotic relationship between business and politics is very much alive today. Klaus 
Mangold, honorary consul of Russia, former Chairman of the Board at DaimlerChrysler 
and chairman of the Ostausschuss for 15 years, now heads the commission on strategic ra-
re earths in the industry ministry and leads the working group on economics in the Peters-
burg Dialogues. 
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Germany in Russian eyes  
The reasons for the end of the Cold War are still debated, but it is be-
yond doubt that Gorbachev’s historical decision to agree to a united 
Germany in NATO and the peaceful retreat of the Soviet military pro-
vided the preconditions for a solution to the German Question. From 
the recognition of German unity in 1990 and till the withdrawal of all 
Soviet troops in 1994, Russia was an essential partner. At a bilateral 
meeting in Stavropol between Kohl and Gorbachev in July 1990, the 
Soviet leader – much to the surprise of the German chancellor– grant-
ed all of Germany’s demands, including continued NATO member-
ship for a unified Germany.28 And only two months later, the ‘Treaty 
on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany’, better known as 
the 2+4 Agreement, was signed in Moscow, on 12 September 1990.  
 
In the following years, in return for services rendered and out of con-
cern for Russia’s inner stability, in addition to financial help, Germany 
became a leading force in giving assurances and guarantees to Russia, 
accompanying reforms and lobbying for the inclusion of Russia into 
international bodies such as the Council of Europe (1996), the EU–
Russia partnership and cooperation agreement (1997), the G-8 (1997), 
the NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council (1998) and the NATO–
Russia Council (2002). Thus, Germany acted not only as an advocate 
of Russian interests in Europe, but also as an important purveyor of 
international legitimacy and recognition.   
 
In Russia, the value of close relations with Germany is widely accept-
ed and is basically uncontroversial. From statists to liberals, whether 
favourable to a multi-vector foreign policy or an alliance with the 
West, no one would deny the importance of a close partnership with 
Germany – for its own sake or as a gateway to the Euro-Atlantic 
community. The economic, technical and political benefits of such a 
partnership are obvious.  
 
It is therefore no coincidence that Russia uses Berlin as a platform for 
announcing high-profile political initiatives. For example, Dmitri 
Medvedev chose Berlin to announce his proposal for a new European 
security architecture (2008) as did Putin with his proposal for a Euro-
pean free trade zone (2009). 
  
Germany enjoys great confidence and prestige in Russia, where Ger-
man motives are generally perceived to be more honest than American 
or Chinese ones. In a poll conducted by the Levada Centre in May 
2011, when asked to name Russia’s five closest friends and allies, 
                                                 
28  ‘Among all, the alliance question seemed to be the squaring of the circle. Only the grea-
test optimists believed in a miracle, in a historic turning point’: H. Kohl,2009,  Vom Mau-
erfall zur Wiedervereinigung. München: Knaur Taschenbuch Verlag, p. 326.  
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20% of the respondents answered Germany, putting it in fourth place 
after neighbouring Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. At the opposite 
end of the scale, 33% of the respondents considered the USA to be 
among the top five in the list of least friendly countries, in fourth 
place after Georgia, Latvia and Lithuania. Only 4% of the respondents 
saw Germany as an enemy and 5% the USA as a close friend.  Fur-
thermore, 84% of those polled said they had a very good or good opin-
ion of Germany: that puts Germany in first place, even ahead of Rus-
sia’s post-Soviet neighbours.29  
 
Russia’s quest for recognition by Germany carries multiple implica-
tions – and is not a one-way street. The more Russia is perceived as a 
respectable international actor pursuing legitimate interests, the great-
er the stature of Germany, in the eyes of its Western partners and of its 
own population, to pursue a more differentiated (i.e., pro-Russian) 
partnership policy than today. But there is also another element, and 
that is related to German self-perception.  
  
According to V. I. Daschichev, leading Russian historian and expert 
on Germany, ‘after the reunification in 1990, [Germany] was in reality 
divided up again, but this time in a new configuration: in an American 
and a German Germany’.30 To support this view, he argues that the 
US-led re-education and de-nazification of Germany after the Second 
World War has led to a ‘psychological oppression of the German peo-
ple through the theory of collective guilt’ – which again plays into the 
hands of US hegemony in Europe.31 And thus it should be the task of 
Russian policy-makers to encourage a less complex-ridden, more self-
confident ‘German part’ of Germany.  
 
Regardless of the real merits of such a theory, it is illustrative that the 
country which arguably suffered the most from Hitler’s invasion 
seems the least intent on demanding redemptory gestures from its 
former enemy. A gesture similar to Willy Brandt’s falling on his knees 
in Warsaw in 1970 was unthinkable during the Cold War, but is less 
conceivable today, not least because Russia itself would not want it.32 
                                                 
29  Levada Tsentr. 2011. Otnoschenie k drugim stranam (May 2011). Levada.ru, 1 June 
2011. http://www.levada.ru/press/2011060103.html. Further testifying to the enduring 
prestige of Germany, the number of German language learners in Russia is again on the 
rise, after a slump and despite the dominance of English: ‘Russland lernt deutsch’, 
Welt.de, 18 June. 
2008.http://www.welt.de/welt_print/article2116977/Russland_lernt_Deutsch.html (ac-
cessed 1 June 2013) According to the Goethe Institute, Russia holds an undisputed first 
position in terms of learners of German as a foreign language, with 2.3 million students 
out of 15 million worldwide: ‘Nemetskiy v Rossii’, Goethe.de. 
http://www.goethe.de/ins/ru/lp/prj/ler/gru/dru/ruindex.html (accessed 1 June 2013) 
30  V.I. Daschichev, 2009, ‘Germania i Rossia: vzaimnootnoschenia v razhnie vremena’, in 
Rossiysko-germanskie otnoschenie v kontekste evropeyskoy bezopasnosti. Institut Ekono-
miki RAN, Moscow,  p. 41. Here and elsewhere: all translations are the author’s own. 
31  Daschichev, ‘Germania i Rossia’, p. 37 supra. 
32  Instead, the Bundeswehr has gone directly from foe to friend, parading in Red Square in 
2008. 
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Instead, respect for the defeated carries a double advantage: not only 
does it magnify the value of Russia’s own victory and great-power 
status, it also adds legitimacy to and encourages any signs of Germany 
pursuing a neutralist or ‘third way’ policy.  
A tradition of cooperation across ideological divides 
In October 2007, the quiet southwestern German city of Freiburg was 
the stage for a little-noticed but significant event. The Joseph Wirth 
Foundation, named after the Weimar-era German chancellor, and the 
West–East Society organised a convention to celebrate the 85th anni-
versary of the Rapallo Treaty. This 1922 treaty had initiated a cycle of 
intense economic and clandestine military cooperation between Wei-
mar Germany and Soviet Russia during the inter-war period, which 
continued until Hitler decided a change of policy in 1934. This rap-
prochement between the two pariah states of the day came as a shock 
to the victors of the First World War.33  
 
Along with official Germany in the form of State Secretary Gernot 
Erler (SPD) from the Foreign Office, a specialist on Eastern Europe, 
the event was attended by Nikolai Portugalov, a prominent historical 
figure in German–Soviet diplomacy. Portugalov had played a leading 
role during the 1970 negotiations over the Moscow treaties34 and dur-
ing the 1990 negotiations on German reunification.  
 
As a lesson for the future, the Russian Foreign Ministry veteran told 
his audience: ‘the German leadership today needn’t worry any more 
about the internal political development in Russia, however it might 
evolve, than Chancellor Wirth, a centre politician [Wirth represented 
the Catholic conservative Zentrum party], was frightened off by the 
excesses of the Communist revolution during the conclusion of the 
Rapallo Treaty.35   
 
                                                 
33  Critics have repeatedly pointed to the alleged dangers of a ‘new Rapallo’, meaning a Rus-
so–German deal to overturn the European order. This old analogy is something of a clas-
sic. In 1954, noticing dissent in Adenauer’s coalition over Germany's Western orientation, 
Time magazine published an article titled: ‘Germany: back to Rapallo?’, Time Magazine, 
21 June 1954. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,860799,00.html (ac-
cessed 1 June 2013). On a similar note, back in 1982, voicing uncertainty about Chancel-
lor Helmut Schmidt’s NATO commitments,  New York Times editor William Safire wrote 
an essay, ‘The New Rapallo’, NYT, 22 February 1982. 
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/02/22/opinion/essay-the-new-rapallo.html (accessed 1 
June 2013) In 2009, Polish-French publicist Jaan Kaplinski pondered over the ‘the new 
Rapallo and us’ http://jaankaplinski.blogspot.com/2009/08/new-rapallo-and-us.html (ac-
cessed 1 June 2013) 
34  The crowning achievement of Chancellor Willy Brandt’s détente and cooperation policy 
during the Cold War 
35  N.S. Portugalov, ‘Von Rapallo zu den deutsch-russischen Beziehungen heute’, speech 
delivered at the Joseph Wirth Foundation, Freiburg, 19 October 2007. http://www.wog-
suedbaden.de/cms/upload/Dateien/Infos/Vortrag_Nikolaj-Portugalov.pdf (accessed 1 June 
2013) 
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Stretching back from Rapallo to contemporary politics, there is indeed 
a distinct tradition of Russo–German cooperation cutting across ideo-
logical divides. After the defeat of imperial Germany in 1918, influen-
tial authors such as Karl Haushofer emerged as proponents of Eura-
sianism, advocating an alliance with Communist Russia to challenge 
Anglo-American domination in Europe.36 In a striking parallel to how 
the teachings of Karl Marx’ were received in early 20th century Rus-
sia, Haushofer’s ideological offspring is best traced in early 21st cen-
tury Russia. According to Alexander Dugin, an influential Russian 
politologist and leading figure of neo-Eurasianism, Russia is predes-
tined to hold an independent pivotal position in world politics as the 
centre and balancing point of the Eurasian ‘Heartland’ in its struggle 
against the American maritime empire. In order to realise this ‘mani-
fest destiny’, it is necessary to wrench continental Europe in general, 
and Germany in particular, away from US domination. The perhaps 
most surprising element of Dugin’s analysis is how this is best to be 
achieved: ‘in Germany, the real promoters of the European–Russian 
alliance [against American hegemony] are economic structures: banks, 
big industrial groups, energy companies, who conceive the Russian 
factor in the shape of natural resources, if not as a political model.’37        
 
A bird’s-eye view of post-war German history would tend to divide 
the political spectrum into a more Atlanticist CDU and a more pro-
Russia SPD. Both parties, however, have been divided over Russia. 
 
The political peregrinations of Egon Bahr, the father of Ostpolitik, for 
whom the question of German unity was always primary, can illus-
trate the rifts dividing post-war West Germany. In stature, Bahr can be 
compared to Henry Kissinger. After the Second World War, Bahr, 
who in one interview described himself as the last of the ‘Deutchna-
tionale’,38 first sympathised with the Christian Democrat Jakob Kai-
ser. Kaiser was a proponent of the ‘bridge’ theory, according to which 
a neutral and reunified Germany should serve as an honest broker be-
tween East and West. In all logic, Kaiser, who at the time was minister 
for all-German affairs in Adenauer’s government, responded positive-
                                                 
36  In a certain sense, Hitler’s infamous foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, the archi-
tect of the German–Soviet non-aggression pact in August 1939, can also be seen as part of 
this tradition. Ribbentrop opposed the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. Subse-
quently, his influence within the Nazi apparatus waned.   
37  A.G.Dugin, 2007, Geopolitika postmoderna, Saint Petersburg: Amfora 2007, p. 142. Not 
unlike how Soviet Communists proclaimed that Moscow, and not Berlin, would be the 
centre of world communism, Dugin has moved the gravitational centre of the ‘Heartland’ 
eastwards to Russia. Amateurs of geo-politics could seek parallels to the Churchill-like 
concept of a ‘special relation’ between Great Britain and the United States, in which the 
former has inherited the latter’s former role and status in world politics.  
38  Interview with Egon Bahr. ORB-Fernsehen, 9 April 2001 Deutschland im Blick, Egon 
Bahr zum 85. Gebutstag, 2007. Berlin: Vorwärts Buch.  (ed.D. Münkel). 
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ly to the 1952 Stalin note, a Soviet proposal for German reunification 
in return for strict neutrality.39  
 
Chancellor Adenauer, however, made the historic choice of anchoring 
Germany to the West. In response to the Stalin note, Adenauer deliv-
ered a speech on 20 July 1952 where he refuted the European nature 
of Russia and denounced Communism as an expression of ‘the cultur-
ally backward part of Asia’.40 Only three years later, West Germany 
joined NATO and became a driving force for European integration.  
 
With the ensuing marginalisation of Jakob Kaiser within the Christian 
Democrats, Bahr switched his political allegiance to the Social Demo-
crats. When Willy Brandt became chancellor in 1969, Bahr, as secre-
tary of state and special representative, was able to put his ideas into 
practice. The ensuing Ostpolitik, which prescribed ‘Wandel durch 
Annäherung’ or ‘change through rapprochement’ with East Germany 
and the Soviet Union, resulted in the signing of the 1970 Moscow 
treaties. The ensuing détente in East–West relations laid the ground 
for the 1975 Helsinki Agreement.  
 
According to the views held by Egon Bahr at the time, NATO was due 
to disappear with the end of the Cold War and German reunification. 
Valentin Falin, the Soviet ambassador in charge of negotiations, even 
hoped that the Moscow treaties would pave the way for a future geo-
strategic partnership between Germany and Russia.41 
 
Thus Egon Bahr is part of the long tradition of pragmatic realpolitik 
and cooperation with Russia. In a 2005 interview in the conservative 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Bahr explained: ‘I was only ever in-
terested in Germany. I didn’t become a Social Democrat in order to 
nationalise the banks. No, I became a Social Democrat because I was 
of the opinion that Adenauer did not mean it seriously and Schumach-
er [the SPD leader at the time] meant it seriously with the priority giv-
en to Germany policy (Deutschlandspolitik, meaning reunification)’.42  
 
Just as the SPD’s Russia policy is in the tradition of Egon Bahr, the 
Willy Brandt House on Berlin’s main thoroughfare, Unter den Linden, 
stands right in front of the massive building of the Russian embassy. 
                                                 
39  In 1952, the West German political establishment was divided as to the sincerity of the 
Stalin note. Later disclosed Soviet archives have sparked a new row of debate. See for 
example: ‘Die Stalin-Note vom 10. März 1952: Neue Quellen und Analysen’, Schriften-
reihe der Viertelsjahrhefte für Zeitgeschichte, 2002. Oldenbourg (ed. Zarusky).   
40  Peter Brandt, 2002, ‘Das deutsche Bild Russlands und der russen in der modernen’, Iablis, 
Jahrbuch für europäische Prozesse. http://www.iablis.de/iablis_t/2002/brandt.htm (acces-
sed 1 June 2013) 
41  Deutschland im Blick, Egon Bahr zum 85. Gebutstag (ORB-Fernsehen, 9 April 2001).. 
42  Interview with Egon Bahr. FAZ.net, 24 April 2005. 
http://www.faz.net/artikel/C30351/egon-bahr-ich-habe-mit-allem-was-geschehen-ist-
erreicht-was-ich-wollte-30159563.html (accessed 1 June 2013) 
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No less symbolically, a portrait of Bismarck adorns the office of ex-
SPD chancellor Gerhard Schröder. Since the Iron Chancellor actually 
outlawed the SPD, but actively pursued a policy of friendship and ac-
commodation with Russia, the portrait can only be meant as an allu-
sion to Schröder’s pro-Russia policy and current position as board di-
rector for the Nord Stream gas pipeline consortium, the emblematic 
Russo–German bilateral project which was launched just before 
Schröder left office.43 
Strategic partnership or business partner? 
Schröder unceasingly promoted the idea of a strategic partnership with 
Russia:  
 
Europe, Germany and Russia are pursuing the same or similar central strategic 
goals – creating a lasting peaceful order for the whole of Europe, stabilising our 
common neighbourhood in the Middle East, combating terrorism and the prolif-
eration of weapons of mass destruction and finally, developing an ‘effective mul-
tilateralism’. At the same time, we have the chance to tap the vast potential of the 
Eurasian economic zone for our mutual benefit.44  
 
When Schröder’s coalition of Social Democrats and Greens left office 
in 2005, the grand coalition of Conservatives and Social Democrats 
(in office 2005–2009) continued with the same Russia policy as that 
of their predecessors. As part of the informal power-sharing agree-
ment between the two coalition partners, Russia policy remained firm-
ly in the hands of Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who had 
previously served as Schröder’s cabinet secretary. Steinmeier contin-
ued the strategy of overtures to Russia summarised in the formula 
‘Annäherung durch Verflechtung’ (rapprochement through interweav-
ing) – a clear allusion to Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr’s ‘Wandel 
durch Annäherung’.45  
 
The 2005 coalition agreement between the SPD and CDU/CSU in-
cludes this statement of intentions with regard to Russia: 
  
Together with our European partners, we are in favour of a strategic partnership 
with Russia that we will promote at every level of bilateral relations and at the 
EU level. Germany has a particular interest in supporting the difficult modernisa-
tion of the country through reinforced political, economic and civil society coop-
eration. The objective remains a prosperous Russia, oriented towards the values 
                                                 
43  ‘Mächtig viel Freiheit’, Suddeutsche.de, 24 October 
2008.http://archiv.sueddeutsche.apa.at/sueddz/index.php?id=A42933302_EGTPOGWPP
HOPWSGRWTEEEPW (accessed 1 June 2013) 
44  Gerhard Schröder, ‘Russia and Germany: the core tenet of cooperation’, Russia in Global 
Affairs, 4, October–December 2004. http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_3875 (accessed 
1 June 2013) 
45  ‘Berlin schlägt in der EU-Russlandpolitik “Annäherung durch Verflechtung” vor’, Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 September 2006, p.5 
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which commit Europe and mindful of its traditions, which will successfully 
manage its transformation into a stable democracy.46  
 
Two instruments were developed during the years of the Red/Green 
(1998–2005) and Red/Black coalitions (2005–2009) to operationalize 
the concept of a strategic partnership and Annäherung durch Verflech-
tung: the partnership for modernization, and the Petersburg Dialogues.  
 
These dialogues, launched by Putin and Schröder in 2001, are intend-
ed as the civil-society supplement to the strategic partnership, underly-
ing the transformative and norm-diffusing nature of Germany’s rela-
tionship with neighbouring countries. By accompanying Russia to-
wards democracy, the intention behind the dialogues is to add a posi-
tive transformative element to the bilateral relationship. The dialogues 
take place once a year, alternating between Russia and Germany, and 
bring together large delegations from both countries. The official In-
ternet web-site presents the main objective of the dialogue as ‘further-
ing understanding between the civil societies of both countries’, im-
mediately adding that ‘it stands under the patronage of the acting 
German chancellor and the acting Russian president’. The Petersburg 
Dialogues have been criticised for being a top–down construction pi-
loted from the Kremlin and the Chancellor’s Office, and human rights 
groups have dismissed the meetings as a window-dressing operation. 
Given the state of civil society in Russia, the key question is whether 
the Petersburg Dialogues should  be called a ‘forum for exchange be-
tween civil societies’, when they are actually just as much a strategic 
forum accompanied by high-level bilateral meetings. The names of the 
different working groups for 2010 leave all options open. Besides 
working groups on civil society and media, there are working groups 
on education, science and health, on culture and on churches in Eu-
rope. The three most important could well be those on politics, eco-
nomics and finally the group on ‘shaping the future’.47     
 
In his opening speech in St Petersburg in 2001, Vladimir Putin made 
no secret of his expectations: ‘The most important is to develop com-
mon perspectives, namely perspectives for long-term cooperation. 
This also encompasses economic cooperation […]’ and added that 
economic cooperation would be the main content of the upcoming 
consultations with his German colleague.48  
 
                                                 
46  Coalition agreement between the CDU, CSU and SPD. Gemeinsam für Deutschland. Mit 
Mut und Menschlichkeit. p.157.http://www.cducsu.de/upload/koavertrag0509.pdf (ac-
cessed 1 June 2013) 
47  This is the Zukunftsgestaltung, led by the many-hatted Alexander Rahr. 
48  Words of welcome from Russian President Vladimir Putin to the opening session of the 
Petersburg Dialogues, St. Petersburg 2001. Available at:  http://www.petersburger-
dialog.de/grusswort-des-russischen-praesidenten-wladimir-putin-0 (accessed 1 June 2013) 
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Unwittingly, the ambivalence and essentially instrumental character of 
the forum was further underlined by Schröder’s parallel wish to estab-
lish a ‘strategic partnership’ with China, without any accompanying 
civil society dialogue.49 As it stands today, the Petersburg Dialogues 
are best understood as a strategic forum to accompany the modernisa-
tion partnership, rather than a dialogue of civil societies.  
 
The Russo–German modernisation partnership was formalised in 
2008, thus preceding the EU–Russia modernisation partnership of 
2010, which has yet to be put into practice. In a joint op-ed, foreign 
ministers Westerwelle and Lavrov underlined the desire to take the 
lead in setting the agenda for EU-Russia relations: ‘The modernisation 
partnership currently being built by the European Union and Russia 
follows the German–Russian model. Our bilateral experiences will 
benefit the European–Russian project.’50  
 
The partnership can boast several concrete achievements, first and 
foremost within the realm of economics and technology transfer. In 
2009, the German–Russian Energy Agency (Rudea) was set up in or-
der to promote cooperation and technology transfers between German 
and Russian companies.51 And the German industrial corporation 
Siemens has been chosen as a key partner for building the Skolkovo 
science and innovation city, a centrepiece of Russia’s modernisation 
strategy and a project in which President Medvedev invested substan-
tial personal prestige. ‘Modernisation’ has continued to be a key ele-
ment of the Russian domestic policy discourse and is at the core of the 
‘Medvedev doctrine’ as expressed in the famous September 2009 arti-
cle ‘Go Russia’.52  
 
Germany thus remains committed to Russian economic reform policy, 
and the Russian leadership has made repeated statements that Germa-
ny is the country’s most important modernisation partner. As if to 
echo the modernisation partnership, ‘Germany and Russia – shaping 
the future together’ was chosen as the official slogan of ‘Germany’s 
year in Russia’, from June 2012 to July 2013. 
 
According to a strategy paper from the Russian Foreign Ministry, 
Russia would need at least €1 billion until 2013 to upgrade its infra-
                                                 
49  The Petersburg Dialogues have also some concrete achievements of their own, most nota-
bly a significant increase in youth exchange programmes. 
50  ‘The German–Russian Modernization Partnership’, Federal Foreign Minister Westerwelle 
and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov in the FAZ, undated. www.auswaertiges-amt.de. 
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Infoservice/Presse/Interview/2010/100531-BM-
FAZ.html (accessed 1 June 2013) 
51  A particular focus is the crucial field of energy efficiency, as with the establishment of 
German Science and Innovation Forum in Moscow (DWIH), where Moscow was selected 
alongside New York, Sao Paolo, Tokyo and Delhi.  
52  D. Medvedev, ‘Go Russia! ’ eng.kremlin.ru, 10 September 2009 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/298 (accessed 1 June 2013) 
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structure as part of its modernisation programme, but also substantial 
technological assistance and investment from abroad. The paper, pub-
lished in the Russian edition of Newsweek, called for a ‘modernisation 
alliance’ with Germany that would go beyond the support already giv-
en by German industry and government for several major infrastruc-
ture projects.53  
 
In this context, we should note the conclusions of Trendmonitor, a pe-
riodical survey on the outlook of public opinion on the German–
Russian modernisation partnership, which appears very much in phase 
with the political leadership:  ‘If we analyse the shape of public opin-
ion in Russia, we see that Germany remains the preferred ‘modernisa-
tion partner’ for Russians.’ Furthermore, ‘Within the EU, Germany is 
virtually the only country worth considering in the eyes of the Rus-
sians: while 20 per cent voice their support for Germany (as primary 
modernisation partner), for France, which is the second preferred EU 
country, this figure is not even two per cent’. China and the United 
States garner 10.8 and 7.8 per cent, respectively, of the favourable 
opinion.54 
 
Alexander Rahr, Senior Programme Director at the DGAP, who or-
dered the survey, remains confident that ‘the competition from China 
should not be taken too seriously, because for Russians, China re-
mains a distant culture, while Germany is regarded as a model of civi-
lisation’.55  
 
If Germany is viewed favourably by the general Russian public, the 
sentiment of curiosity so typical of Germans and which prevailed in 
Germany in the 1980s and 1990s, has now given way to increased 
scepticism. According to the results of Transatlantic Trends 2012, alt-
hough 71 per cent of the Russians surveyed said they held a positive 
opinion of Germany, a full 63 per cent of the German respondents 
now hold an unfavourable view of Russia.56 This state of public opin-
ion is a serious obstacle to the Russo–German partnership.   
                                                 
53  ‘Russia seeks tighter ties with Germany’, NYtimes.com, 4 June 2010. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/05/world/europe/05iht-germany.html (accessed 1 June 
2013) 
54  ‘Modernization Partnership between Germany and Russia’, Trendmonitor I, undated. 
http://www.eu-russia-forum.net/eu-russia-forum/wp-content/uploads/110224-
trendmonitor-i_factsheet_english.pdf (accessed 1 June 2013) 
55‘ Modern Russia and Alexander Rahr. German companies thriving in Russia, pioneer 
“modernization partnerships”’, Modernrussia.com, 26 April 2011. 
http://www.modernrussia.com/content/german-companies-thriving-russia-pioneer-
%E2%80%9Cmodernization-partnerships%E2%80%9D 
56  ‘Country profile: Russia’, Transatlantic Trends 2012. 
http://trends.gmfus.org/transatlantic-trends/country-profiles-2/russia/ (accessed 1 June 
2013) 
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Bridging values and interests?  
The deepening discrepancy between the defence of pluralistic values 
and the pursuit of economic interests ensures that cooperation with 
Russia is set to remain a subject of discord in Germany. The quite ex-
traordinary media attention and ensuing intra-Russian ‘culture war’ 
which broke out after the imprisonment of members of the feminist 
punk performance group Pussy Riot left an uneasy feeling in the gen-
eral public and in the political establishment alike.57 On 7 August 
2012, 121 German parliamentarians representing all factions in the 
Bundestag addressed a letter of protest to the Russian ambassador 
calling for mild sentences.58  
 
The Pussy Riot case is but the latest of a long series of symbolic 
clashes pitting values against interests. In 2011, it was announced that 
the annual German Quadriga prize, an award recognising outstanding 
contributions to ‘innovation, renewal, and a pioneering spirit’ was to 
be awarded to Vladimir Putin for his commitment to ‘stability through 
the interaction of prosperity, economy and identity.’ This decision by 
influential business members of the prize committee amounted to 
nothing short of all-out praise for the Putin method. After a barrage of 
protests, the award of the prize was finally suspended.59 At the other 
end of the spectrum, Werner Schulz of the European Green Party was 
the driving force behind the nomination of Pussy Riot for the Sakha-
rov Human Rights Prize of the European Parliament.60 
 
It is hard to assess the real and lasting damage these and otherwise 
more serious matters, such as the unresolved murders of journalists or 
the general climate of political repression, have on Russian–German 
relations. Regarding the Pussy Riot case, it is worth noting that 499 
out of 620 German MPs thought it better to withhold their criticism 
for another day.  
 
Conscious that German–Russian relations have reached an impasse on 
the subject of values, the liberal democratic leadership in the Foreign 
Ministry, a party traditionally built on a dual pro-business and rule of 
                                                 
57  On 21 February 2012, members of the group interrupted the church service and staged an 
illegal performance in the Moscow cathedral of Christ the Saviour, denouncing Putin and 
the Russian Orthodox Church. On 17 August, three members of the group were convicted 
of hooliganism motivated by religious hatred and sentenced to two-year prison terms.  
58  ‘Appell aus dem Bundestag: Deutsche Abgeordnete fordern Milde für Pussy Riot‘, Spie-
gel.de, 7 August 2012. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundestagsabgeordnete-
fordern-mildes-urteil-im-pussy-riot-prozess-a-848704.html#spCommentsBoxPager  
(accessed 1 June 2013) 
59  ‘Wundersame Bewunderung‘, Sueddeutsche.de, 18 July 2011. 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/wladimir-putin-und-die-deutsche-aussenpolitik-die-
wundersame-bewunderung-fuer-putin-1.1121321(accessed 1 June 2013) 
60  ‘Pussy-Riot unter den Kandidaten für den Sacharow-Preis‘, Europarl.europa.eu. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/de/headlines/content/20120921FCS52015/1/html/Pu
ssy-Riot-unter-Kandidaten-f%C3%BCr-Sacharow-Preis-f%C3%BCr-Geistige-Freiheit-
2012 (accessed 1 June 2013) 
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law platform, has announced its intention of orienting the human 
rights dialogue towards dialogue on the ‘rule of law’, with particular 
attention to economic and administrative law as a complement to the 
modernisation partnership. In a further step that would be particularly 
welcomed by the business community, Germany has made repeated, 
but as yet unsubstantiated, promises to facilitate travel between both 
countries.  
 
Politically, this approach carries the distinct advantage of bridging 
values and interests by addressing the real concerns of the German 
business community investing in Russia, while also providing ready 
answers to apprehensive human rights and advocacy groups. In the 
worst-case scenario, it represents a sell-out to business interests; in an 
unlikely best-case scenario, it would mark the start of a true trans-
formative process. At any rate, the adoption of German legal norms 
would provide German companies with a competitive advantage and 
strengthen the already significant market share of German legal con-
sultancies working with and in Russia. 
  
The mild response from the German Foreign Ministry to the growing 
authoritarianism under Putin-III is proof of Berlin’s continued com-
mitment to the long-standing tradition of partnership and cooperation 
with Russia. In Parliament and in the powerful office of the Chancel-
lor, there are, however, some signs that this consensus is under pres-
sure.  
 
The wording of a parliamentary resolution on ‘strengthening civil so-
ciety and rule of law in Russia through cooperation’61 revealingly dis-
played the ongoing dispute between the Foreign Ministry on the one 
side and Parliament on the other. The original draft by the govern-
ment's appointed coordinator for German–Russian civil society coop-
eration, the CDU-MP Andreas Schockenhoff, was heavily amended 
by the Foreign Ministry. In his original draft, Schockenhoff had writ-
ten: ‘Germany and Europe have a strong interest in a politically and 
economically modern Russia, organized and acting in accordance with 
democratic principles’ (demokratisch verfassten und handelnden 
Russland). In the version amended by the Foreign Ministry, the word 
‘democratic’ was simply deleted. This was but the first of a series of 
changes aimed at defusing criticism. Other sentences, such as ‘after 
years of controlled democracy and apathy, many people in Russia are 
again ready to engage themselves actively for their country’ or ‘politi-
cally active citizens are perceived by the authorities not as partners, 
                                                 
61  Durch Zusammenarbeit Zivilgesellschaft und Rechtstaatlichkeit in Russland stärken. Mo-
tion of the CDU/CSU and FDP factions. 17/11327, 6 November 2012. 
http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/113/1711327.pdf (accessed 1 June 2013) 
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but as opponents’ were also removed.62 The final version adopted by 
the Bundestag on 8 November 2012 was a compromise, with some of 
the harshest criticism defused, but retaining a list of 17 points de-
manding (fordern) that the government take a critical stand on issues 
such as democracy, human rights and civil society. The CDU and FDP 
voted in favour, whereas the Green Party, the SPD and the Left Party 
chose to abstain. The first found the draft too soft, whereas the latter 
deemed the wording to be excessive.   
 
Only a week before the Merkel–Putin consultations on 15 November  
2012, this war of words did not go unnoticed and ensured a chillier 
atmosphere than usual in Moscow. The Russian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs had voiced strong criticism of Schockenhoff’s declarations and 
had cancelled a planned meeting, even intimating that Schockenhoff 
was not a legitimate representative of the German government. Prior 
to the meeting in Moscow, both parties were working hard at mending 
fences. German government circles gave assurances that the ‘strategic 
partnership’ remained the guiding principle of Germany's Russia poli-
cy. Angela Merkel, although she did express some criticism, said it 
was not up to her to work through the details of the 17 points in the 
Bundestag Declaration during her Moscow meetings.63 And finally, 
Andreas Schockenhoff could assure his counterparts that the Bundes-
tag had no intention of giving any ‘pedantic instructions from 
abroad’.64   
 
The more distant relationship between Merkel and her Russian coun-
terpart certainly stands in stark contrast to the warm camaraderie of 
the Schröder–Putin years. Although it could well be argued that Mer-
kel’s coolness is not reserved solely for Russians, it does mark the end 
of certain German illusions, if not ambitions, as to the prospects of a 
rapidly Westernising Russia.  
 
On the whole, there is a lack of tangible elements indicating any real 
reorientation of Germany's Russia policy. Neither Merkel's recent visit 
to Moscow nor the Bundestag declaration put into question the exist-
ence of the German–Russian strategic partnership, calling instead for 
cooperation to be expanded beyond the economic-technical field to 
include such far-reaching goals as ‘the promotion of democracy, hu-
man rights, rule of law, civil society, active citizenship and the growth 
                                                 
62  ‘Auswärtiges Amt entschärft Kritik an Putin’, Sueddeutsche.de, 9 October 2012 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/deutsch-russisches-verhaeltnis-auswaertiges-amt-
entschaerft-kritik-an-putin-1.1490852 (accessed 1 June 2013) 
63  ‘Berlin hält an Partnerschaft mit Moskau fest’, FAZ.net, 15 November 2012. 
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/regierungskonsultationen-berlin-haelt-an-partnerschaft-
mit-moskau-fest-11961578.html (accessed 1 June 2013) 
64  ‘Deutsche Kritik empört Russland’, Handelsblatt.com, 16 November 2012. 
http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/petersburger-dialog-deutsche-kritik-
empoert-russland/7397962.html (accessed 1 June 2013) 
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of a broad middle class’.65 German policy-makers seem highly appre-
hensive as to such prospects, and as long as the German leadership 
keeps talking of ‘strategic cooperation’, it is safe to bet that Germany's 
Russia policy will remain basically unchanged. 
 
In pragmatic German eyes, the perhaps most worrying aspect of Rus-
sia under Putin's third mandate is more likely to be the increasing state 
control of the economy, the inability to curb corruption, and budget 
balancing at an oil price of 113 dollars a barrel. More than anything 
else, the recent developments bear witness to a sobered and matured 
German–Russian relationship that has gravitated back to its solid eco-
nomic core: energy, raw materials and technology transfer. Germany 
needs Russia for its oil and gas; and for the Russian export market, 
Russia needs German technology and export revenues from the sales 
of hydrocarbons.66 
                                                 
65  Supra note 62 
66  For example, a € 2.5 billion agreement on the sale of high-speed trains by Siemens and a 
memorandum on the strategic cooperation between the Frankfurt and Moscow stock ex-
changes, catering for Moscow's ambition to become a leading financial centre, were 
signed at the November 2012 meeting in Moscow. See ‘Deutsche Börse: Strategische 
Partnerschaft mit Moscow Exchange’, Finanzen.net, 16 November 2012 (accessed 1 June 
2013). 
Energy Policy 
Statistics and surveys 
Germany is the world’s largest importer of Russian oil and gas, and 
Russia has been Germany’s primary source for oil and gas imports 
since before the fall of the Soviet Union.67 Total German imports of 
raw materials amounted to € 83.9 billion in 2009. Fossil energy alone 
made up 71.6% of the total, with oil and natural gas representing 
36.9% and 28.6% respectively and coal another 4.6%. Germany’s im-
port dependency is very high: 97% of its total oil consumption and 
84% of natural gas consumption 
 
According to statistics published by the Ministry of Economy, Russian 
gas amounted to 39% of total German gas imports in 2010. When do-
mestic gas production is included, Russian gas thus covers 35% of to-
tal German consumption. Despite a 63% growth in volume since 1991 
and contrary to widespread impressions, the share of Russian gas in 
total German consumption has remained remarkably constant over the 
past 20 years (35% in 2005, 37% in 2000, 37% in 1995 and 33% in 
1991). This is due mainly to the sharp increase in Norwegian gas im-
ports, which represented only 12.7% of total consumption in 1991, but 
is up to 31% today. However, with Germany’s decision to abandon 
nuclear power by 2022 and with the Nord Stream Baltic gas pipeline 
fully operational, there is an important potential for further growth, in 
both absolute and relative terms.  
 
For oil, the share of Russian imports has risen from 15.8% in 1991 to 
36.3% by 2010 (33.9 million tons), but the growth potential is now 
exhausted, since German oil consumption peaked in 2005. Energy im-
ports are not restricted to oil and natural gas: Russia is now also Ger-
many’s biggest supplier of coal, with 9.5 million tons (up from a neg-
ligible 212,000 tons in 1998), representing 24% of total consumption. 
As for natural gas, the German government’s decision to abandon nu-
clear power has created considerable growth potential.68  
                                                 
67  The position as leader on the German market was briefly challenged by Norway in 1993 
and in 1995, when imports of Norwegian oil exceeded imports of Russian oil. 
68  All figures and calculations from Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausführkontrolle, 
www.bafa.de and Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie, www.bmwi.de 
(accessed 1 June 2013). 
34 Victor Waldemar Jensen 
Dependence or interdependence? The German experience  
As shown by the above statistics, German dependency on Russian en-
ergy supplies is an irrefutable fact. This also makes Germany Russia’s 
biggest source of foreign currency. When asked whether this situation 
is actually a challenge or an opportunity, public opinion is divided. On 
the one hand, in a 2009 survey, 62% of the Germans polled (only 56% 
of the East Germans in the sample) say they are somewhat or very 
concerned about dependency on Russian energy.69 However, the earli-
er-mentioned Trendmonitor survey70 showed that 72% of the Germans 
interviewed were  positive to further expanding the energy partnership 
with Russia, even though only 16% of the respondents cited Russia’s 
reliability and stability as a partner as the main reason for pursuing 
such a policy.  
 
By its very nature, energy policy lies at the crossroads of geography, 
trade and politics. Diverging interpretations make it a subject for con-
tention between the USA, Germany and Eastern Europe, further com-
plicated by the agenda of the EU Commission. Germany remains the 
West European country with the longest-standing energy relationship 
with Russia, thus making its experience unique and distinctive. 
 
The first chapter of the ‘energy wars’ between Russia and Europe, if 
there ever was such a thing, was opened by West Germany some 50 
years ago. After the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, Bonn re-
taliated with a pipeline embargo, prohibiting the sale of pipeline tubes 
to the USSR. This move considerably delayed the commissioning of 
the ‘friendship’ oil pipeline, which was to connect East Germany to 
the USSR. The decision to impose the embargo was reached at the 
highest level in the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the political body 
of NATO. The debate over the securitisation of energy policy, an idea 
raised by the USA and some Eastern European countries prior to the 
2010 NATO summit in Lisbon, is thus nothing new.   
 
In 1970, with the adoption of the new Ostpolitik and signing of the 
Moscow treaties, Willy Brandt enacted a radical change of policy and 
lifted the sanctions. Subsequently, the German company Mannesmann 
was granted a huge contract for delivering pipeline tubes to the Soviet 
Union, which in return started supplying ever-increasing quantities of 
oil to West Germany. A decade later, with increased international ten-
sions following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the so-
called euro missile crisis, Bonn and Washington clashed over the con-
struction of a new Soviet gas pipeline, this time intended to supply 
                                                 
69  ‘The Pulse of Europe 2009’, Pewglobal.org, 2 November 2009. 
http://pewglobal.org/2009/11/02/end-of-communism-cheered-but-now-with-more-
reservations/9/#chapter-8-views-of-other-countries-and-organizations (accessed 1 June 
2013) 
70  Supra note 54 
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West Germany. Symptomatically, the title of a research paper written 
in early 1982 sounds oddly contemporary: ‘Soviet energy imports to 
the FRG, dependence or political cooperation?’71 US President 
Reagan imposed sanctions against Western companies contributing to 
the pipeline project and clashed with German Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt and French President François Mitterrand. Later that year, the 
Western powers reached a compromise;72 and from 1984, the Soviet 
Union became Germany’s single biggest supplier of natural gas, a po-
sition Russia has retained ever since.   
 
Independent of general public opinion, experience shows that Russia, 
and before it the Soviet Union, has been a reliable energy partner for 
Germany. Supplies have never been interrupted, not even at the height 
of the Cold War in the early 1980s. This experience has become part 
of conventional wisdom. At a March 2010 seminar organised by the 
Russo–German Raw Materials Conference, Minister of State in the 
Foreign Ministry Cornelia Pieper, recalling the impressive volumes of 
German oil and gas imports, stated: ‘our allegedly too-high dependen-
cy on energy from Russia is therefore often underlined. Still, the fact 
remains that Russia is at least as dependent on exports to Europe as 
we are on energy imports from Russia. Both partners, Germany and 
Russia, therefore complement each other mutually’.73  
 
These declarations came only a year after the Russo–Ukrainian gas 
dispute in January 2009, when Russian gas monopolist Gazprom, hav-
ing accused Kiev of stealing gas transiting through Ukraine, briefly 
cut off supply, sparking a major crisis only months after the August 
2008 Russo–Georgian war.   
 
The German government maintained a cautious line. At the height of 
the crisis, Angela Merkel, although warning about a Russian ‘loss of 
credibility’, essentially condoned the tenets of the commercial analy-
sis and abstained from any unbalanced accusations: ‘It is absolutely 
essential for us to see both Russia and Ukraine sit down at the negoti-
ating table and resolve their issues’, the Chancellor said.74  
 
                                                 
71  Reimund Seidelmann, 1982, ‘Die Sowjetischen Energieimporte in die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, Abhängigkeit oder politische Zusammenarbeit?’ Beiträge zur Kon-
fliktforschung, No 1,  pp. 27–66. 
72  ‘Reagan lifts sanctions for Soviet pipeline; Reports accord with Allies’, NYT, 14 Novem-
ber 1982. http://www.nytimes. com/1982/11/14/world/reagan-lifts-sanctions-on-sales-for-
soviet-pipeline-reports-accord-with-allies.html (accessed 1 June 2013) 
73  Cornelia Pieper, ‘Die deutsch-russischen Rohstoffbeziehungen im Kontext deutscher 
Aussenpolitik’, Speech at the third German–Russian energy forum. Freiburg, 18 March 
2010. http://www.rohstoff-
forum.org/content/images/3_rohstoff_konferenz/vortraege/RohstoffKonferenz_Redebeitra
gAA_StMinPieper_Protokollfassung.pdf (accessed 1 June 2013)  
74  ‘Ukraine rejects latest gas requests’, Sptimes.ru, 16 January 2009. 
http://www.sptimes.ru/archive/pdf/1440.pdf (accessed 1 June 2013) 
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Notwithstanding Merkel’s leadership, the gas transit conflict was a 
serious test case for Germany’s energy policy and provoked stark 
Russo-sceptic reactions, not least within the ruling coalition. To 
strengthen German energy independence, CDU and FDP politicians 
advocated expanding and prolonging the lifespan of the country’s nu-
clear plants. CDU co-ordinator for energy policy, Joachim Pfeiffer, 
made the case for an ‘exit from the [nuclear] exit’, explaining that ‘we 
should not further increase our dependency on individual suppliers’75 
Similar demands came from the FDP. 
 
These individual reactions notwithstanding, German analysts lend lim-
ited credence to the thesis of a political-strategic use of the Russian 
‘energy weapon’. Instead, they explain Gazprom’s decisions in com-
mercial terms.76 Whereas the Western press generally featured big 
headlines on the Kremlin’s use of ‘energy as a weapon’, the former 
director of the Russia programme at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, Roland Götz, dismissed such geo-political interpretations out 
of hand, and correctly predicted that the on-going ‘commercial con-
flict’ would be settled, if not permanently resolved, within a couple of 
days. Furthermore, according to Götz, the ‘vulnerability thesis’ (of 
European dependency on Russian gas translating into political in-
feodation to the Kremlin) ‘is strongly influenced by US think-tanks 
like the Heritage Foundation and the Nixon Center who advocate a 
geo-political approach.’77  
 
Some would go even further. As member of the board of the presidi-
um of the German–Russian Raw Materials Conference, and former 
Minister-President of Bavaria, Edmund Stoiber is one of many influ-
ential German ex-politicians with good connections to the Russo–
German energy nexus. In an article calling for strengthened coopera-
tion with Russia, Stoiber, having explained how German–Russian en-
ergy cooperation should be the starting point for the EU’s modernisa-
tion partnership with Russia, elegantly reverses the whole litany that 
critics have generally addressed to Moscow: ‘Europe’s call for alter-
native (import) routes for energy and raw materials increases insecuri-
                                                 
75  ‘Merkel interveniert im Gasstreit’,  Handelsblatt.com, 7 January 2009. 
http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/energieversorgung-merkel-interveniert-
im-gasstreit/3083640.html  (accessed 1 June 2013). 
76  Similarly, one should be careful about drawing hasty conclusions about the composition 
of the board of, for example, Gazprom Germania ( Gazprom’s German outlet) and equat-
ing it with a hidden political agenda devoid of commercial considerations. The company's 
long-time director, Hans-Joachim Gornig, was the former vice-minister of energy of the 
GDR and is thus very well connected in Moscow, but his the former Russian ambassador 
to Berlin Vladimir Kotenjov, had a very short stint as company director due to lack of 
business flair and taking personal advantages (‘Begrenzte Haltbarkeit’, Der Spiegel, 11 
June 2011, p.  42)  
77  Interview with Roland Götz. Sueddeutsche.de, 17 May 2010. 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/gas-streit-moskau-nutzt-seine-energie-nicht-als-
waffe-1.384566 (accessed 1 June 2013) 
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ty over the reliability and contract compliance of the Western part-
ners.’78  
 
Ultimately, the best indicator of the real importance accorded to for-
eign policy questions is to measure their impact in the face of a con-
tradicting agenda in domestic policy. Reactions to the March 2011 nu-
clear accident in Fukushima, Japan, provides a prime example of such 
a test case. Overnight, the accident created a massive movement in 
German public opinion in favour of abandoning nuclear energy alto-
gether. In a spectacular turnabout, the ruling Conservative/Liberal 
coalition promptly aligned itself with public opinion; and the Ato-
maussteig, an ambitious plan for greatly accelerating the total phase-
out of nuclear energy, was hastily driven through the Bundestag. At 
that time, nuclear power accounted for 23% of total German electrici-
ty production. Independent of any progress in the field of renewables, 
it was evident that a significant part of this would have to be compen-
sated by increased reliance on Russian hydrocarbons. German politi-
cal voices who had been most critical of Russia, citing the possible 
risks inherent in such a situation, kept silent throughout the debate, 
thus giving a clear indication of the new priorities. 
Nord Stream 
The series of gas disputes between Russia and transit countries cer-
tainly gave a strong impetus to realisation of the Nord Stream Baltic 
gas pipeline project, which became operational in June 2011. The 
pipeline, a 1220km connection under the Baltic Sea between Vyborg 
and Greifswald, is a joint project between Gazprom (51%), the Ger-
man companies BASF/Wintershall (15.5%) and E.ON (15.5%) and 
Dutch Gasunie (9%). In 2010, the French utility company GDF-Suez 
acquired a 9% stake from E.ON and BASF. When fully operational in 
the last quarter of 2012, the two lines were to have the capacity to 
supply 55 billion cubic metres (bcm) of Russian gas a year to the EU 
for at least 50 years.79 The deal, signed just before Schröder left office 
in 2005, stands as perhaps the most emblematic and lasting monument 
to the Schröder–Putin years. Soon after, the former chancellor went to 
become director of the board of the joint company, a move for which 
he was widely criticised. Because Nord Stream circumvents the East-
ern European transit routes and theoretically gives Russia leverage to 
blackmail its neighbours without hurting gas supplies to Germany and 
Western Europe, Alexandros Petersen from the Atlantic Council went 
as far as to dub the project the ‘Molotov–Ribbentrop pipeline’ – a ref-
                                                 
78  Edmund Stoiber, 2010, ‘Kooperation mit mehr Energie’, Internationale Politik, Janua-
ry/February 2010, no.1, p.  65 
79  http://www.nord-stream.com/pipeline/ 
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erence to the infamous 1939 agreement between Hitler and Stalin for 
carving up Eastern Europe.80  
 
Schröder himself, however, has refuted any allegations of sell-out to 
Russian interests. It can at least be argued that, in moving from poli-
tics to business, he has not shifted his stance. During the January 2009 
gas crisis, Schröder, fully in line with the new German government, 
explained that ‘Nord Stream is an extremely important project... to 
strengthen the energy security not only of Germany but of all of Eu-
rope’.81 Michael Sasse, head of public relations at Wintershall, one of 
the Nord Stream partners, had made clear what German politicians 
will allude to only indirectly. In an article published in Internationale 
Politik, after reminding his readers that 120 bcm of gas transits 
Ukraine every year, Sasse writes: ‘the 2009 transit conflict showed the 
risks of this route’, implying that Russia and Gazprom in itself are less 
of a problem than is the turbulent relationship between Russia and 
Ukraine.82  
South Stream 
In discussing joint pipeline projects, we should also recall that Schrö-
der’s foreign minister from the Green Party, Joschka Fischer, accepted 
a lobbyist position for the US- and Brussels-backed Nabucco pipeline 
project. This project seeks to do the exact opposite of the Nord Stream 
pipeline: namely, to circumvent Russia by transporting gas from 
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and possibly Iraqi Kurdistan to Europe 
through Turkey. In reply to widespread allegations, also by Schröder, 
that Nabucco would be dependent on Iranian gas to be operational, 
Fischer stated: ‘Gazprom sees its position of monopolist in the supply 
of gas to Europe endangered. But the Europeans can’t rely on having 
only one single gas supplier.’83  
 
Russia has launched the South Stream gas pipeline project as an alter-
native and direct competitor to Nabucco. As with Nord Stream, the 
aim is to circumvent problematic transit countries, in this case by a 
direct route from Russia to Bulgaria through the Black Sea. The con-
sortium involves Gazprom, Italian ENI, French EDF and German 
                                                 
80  ‘The Molotov–Ribbentrop pipeline’, Wsj.com, 9 November 2009 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703567204574499150087261242.html 
(accessed 1 June 2013) 
81  http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1231466531.2 (accessed 1 June 2013) 
82  Michael Sasse, 2011, ‘Energie für alle Fälle’, Internationale Politik, September/October 
2011, no. 5,  Vol. 66. See footnote 88 below   
83  ‘Joschka Fischer kritiziert Russen und Schröder’, Handelsblatt.com, 27 September 2009. 
http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/joschka-fischer-kritisiert-russen-und-
schroeder/3267976.html (accessed 2 June 2013). Interestingly, Schröder, the social demo-
crat derided as ‘comrade of the bosses’ (genosse der Bosse), sceptical to federalist Europe 
and outspoken friend of Russia, clashes with Fischer, a former leftist activist who later re-
invented himself as environmentalist, Euro-federalist and spokesman for military inter-
vention in Kosovo. 
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Wintershall, and has a planned capacity of 63 bcm per year. Marcel 
Kramer, CEO of the South Stream consortium and former head of 
Gasunie, the Dutch company which is also partner in the Nord Stream 
project, is confident that South Stream is ‘an obvious priority in many 
EU capitals’ – thereby implicitly admitting that some EU member 
states do not necessarily share the priorities of the EU Commission.84  
 
Once again, German experts and company spokesmen have been more 
outspoken than the German political leadership. The above-mentioned 
Michael Sasse from Wintershall has explained that, by establishing a 
direct connection to Russia, the pipeline would improve energy securi-
ty for the ‘South Eastern European countries that were directly hurt’ 
by the January 2009 transit crisis.85 In an article titled ‘Forget about 
Nabucco’, Alexander Rahr, the influential pro-Russian head of the 
Bertold-Beitz Centre at the German Society for Foreign Policy 
(DGAP), who also leads one of the working groups of the Petersburg 
Dialogues, maintains that realisation of South Stream would provide 
Europe with ‘an additional guarantee’.86  
 
At the end of the day, the German utilities company RWE, currently 
part of both the Nord Stream and Nabucco consortiums, might hold 
the answer. Allegations put forward in 2010 that RWE had been stud-
ying proposals for entering the South Stream consortium proved short-
lived, but in May 2012, the company announced it was ‘reviewing the 
strategic requirements of Nabucco’.87 This development coincides 
with RWE’s decision to form a strategic partnership with Gazprom for 
joint construction of gas- and coal-fired power plants in Europe, 
which itself is a result of the German government’s decision to aban-
don nuclear power by 2022.88   
 
Germany’s official backing of the EU’s Nabucco project is at best 
half-hearted, since Chancellor Merkel has officially supported all 
three projects and has demanded EU backing for South Stream and 
Nord Stream in return for Nabucco. In a January 2009 letter addressed 
to the Czech presidency of the EU and the EU Commission, in re-
sponse to harsh criticism of the Nord Stream pipeline,89 Merkel ex-
                                                 
84  ‘Companies sign South Stream Deal’, Wsj.com, 16 September 2011. 
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plained that for the sake of ‘more independent and crisis-resistant en-
ergy supply […] it is of great importance that these projects [Nabucco, 
Nord Stream and South Stream] are politically wished for and backed 
by all EU member states’.90 But building all three pipelines would 
generate substantial excess capacity – hardly a financially desirable 
outcome for any of the companies involved.  
 
In the same letter, Merkel also rejected the proposal put forward by 
the Commission and the EU Czech presidency for cushioning the im-
pact of future gas supply interruptions. That proposal included allocat-
ing € 3.5 billion of EU funds to energy security infrastructure such as 
improved interconnectivity between different national gas networks 
and increased storage capacity. Further, the Commission proposed € 
250 million in direct support to Nabucco. Germany, as the largest sin-
gle contributor to the EU budget, would have to contribute a total of 
some € 1 billion. Merkel instead suggested that energy companies 
should themselves bear the costs involved in developing additional 
infrastructure, adding: ‘we shouldn’t free the energy business from 
this responsibility’.91 Germany has shown itself unwilling to be pres-
sured into financing infrastructure in order to meet alleged security 
concerns not necessarily seen as real. In an interview with the present 
author, CDU parliamentarian Karl-Georg Wellmann, a specialist on 
energy questions, wondered why Poland and Lithuania, who advocate 
independence from Russian gas as an essential national priority, had 
so far been unwilling to provide any substantial funding of their own 
to build interconnected networks.92  
A national or European energy strategy? 
Even though all EU member states pay lip service to the concept of a 
common European energy policy, prospects for its realisation remain 
unclear. In March 2003,  a thematic governmental working group on 
German–Russian energy cooperation was established, supplemented 
in October 2006 by the German–Russian Raw Materials Conference. 
These institutions, which alternate between complementarity and ri-
valry with the EU’s own energy dialogue with Russia, reflect the stra-
tegic choices taken by Schröder. According to Kirsten Westphal, ‘the 
politics of the Schröder government from 1998 to 2005, which are 
without doubt characterised by a certain shift away from a multilateral 
approach towards a more unilateral pursuit of interests, reflected the 
prevailing discourse that managing external energy dependency firstly 
demands powerful and competitive companies at the international lev-
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91 Ibid. 
92 Author’s interview  with MP Karl-Georg Wellmann, (CDU/CSU). Berlin, Bundestag, 18 
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el and secondly cannot only be left over to private companies’.93 This 
point can be interpreted in relation to the opposition of Germany, 
along with France, to the EU Commission’s proposal for fully unbun-
dling all production and distribution activities in the gas sector. The 
proposal was effectively buried during the German EU presidency in 
the first half of 2007. In March 2011, a more lenient alternative en-
tered into force, giving member states the choice between allowing 
companies to establish independent subsidiaries to manage transmis-
sion networks, or full unbundling.94 The EON Ruhrgas (2003) and 
GDF Suez (2008) mergers, both of which benefited from strong polit-
ical backing, are clear cases of vertical integration and promotion of 
national champions – in stark contradiction to the EU’s liberalisation 
strategy. The unspoken objective of the EU directive – to undermine 
Gazprom’s bid to acquire European downstream infrastructure – was 
not a sufficient counter-argument for the Germans, especially since 
the new legislation obliges owners of gas pipelines to grant third-party 
access.    
 
With respect to Russia, German energy policy could well be de-
scribed, in line with Kirsten Westfal, as a case of management through 
joint participation instead of management through rules. By encourag-
ing joint stakes in investment, production and transportation along the 
whole production line, Germany seeks to link Russia to the European 
market, and turn energy policy into a very tangible case of ‘Annäher-
ung durch Verflechtung’. Germany seems ready to accept Russian par-
ticipation in and takeover of European utilities and gas networks, and 
does not appear opposed in principle to Gazprom’s presence along the 
whole production and delivery chain.  
 
There are already numerous cases of joint participation. Most im-
portantly, RWE and Dresdner Bank are the largest foreign share-
holders in Gazprom. Prior to the Merkel–Medvedev meeting on 18–19 
July 2011, talks of a possible Gazprom takeover of the hard-pressed 
utilities group RWE were met with positive signals from Germany’s 
Liberal Minister of Economy Philipp Roesler, but were finally aban-
doned. Beside the Gazprom–RWE deal, Energie Baden Wurttemberg 
offered Novatek, Russia’s largest independent natural gas company, 
control of up to a quarter of Verbundnetz Gas, Germany’s third largest 
natural-gas-importing company and a major energy player in Slovakia 
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and the Czech Republic. There are also many examples of joint Rus-
so–German ownership of Eastern European energy infrastructure.95  
 
The raw materials dimension of the Russo–German strategic partner-
ship is not confined to energy resources. In October 2010, Germany 
publicised its raw materials strategy, which aims at ‘[securing] Ger-
many a sustainable supply of non-energy mineral raw materials’, 
where bilateral partnerships are a key component.96 Particular atten-
tion is devoted to rare-earth elements indispensable to the German 
chemical, auto and high-tech industry. At present, more than 95% of 
the world’s supply of rare earths originates in China, and prices have 
soared.97 Chinese export restrictions have also sparked considerable 
concern among German industrialists, who have called for govern-
ment action.98  
 
However, even though China currently produces 95% of the world’s 
supply, only 35% of total exploitable reserves are found in China. In 
addition to the USA and Australia, major reserves are found in Russia 
– which opens up new perspectives for further expanding the resource 
partnership. This topic is strongly promoted by German economic cir-
cles and was recently discussed in the working group on economy at a 
round of the Petersburg Dialogues in Wolfsburg. Germany is interest-
ed not only in increasing its imports of Russian rare-earth elements, 
but also in joint investments with Russia in the exploitation and pro-
cessing of these resources. Valeri Yasev, Deputy Chairman of the 
Russian State Duma, was keen to satisfy expectations and explained to 
his hosts that ‘on the Kola Peninsula, there are a great many deposits 
of rare earths. There is room for strengthening our cooperation in this 
area’. Another prominent Russian guest, Deputy Prime Minister 
Viktor Zubkov, underlined that ‘there are very good possibilities to 
exploit new rare earth deposits’.99 Speaking on behalf of the German 
car industry, Eckhard Schüler-Hanisch, head of the innovation de-
partment at Daimler, replied that ‘bilateral raw material partnerships 
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could certainly ensure a substantial contribution towards securing 
these objectives’ [a better supply of rare earths].100  
 
This approach to Russian interests certainly does not mean that Ger-
many will automatically accept any Russian position in the absence of 
mutual benefits. In 2010, on a visit to the new European Energy Ex-
change in Leipzig, Merkel advocated de-indexation of gas prices and 
accelerated development of the spot market for natural gas. Until now, 
the pricing of gas supplied by Gazprom to Germany has been indexed 
to the oil price, an arrangement generally considered favourable to the 
supply side. However, with the rise of shale gas and signs of a devel-
oping global market thanks to Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), the de-
mand side has increased its leverage to exercise price arbitration, re-
sulting in increased pressure on Russia.101   
 
More generally, Germany has been lobbying hard to secure reciprocity 
and equal market access. The Ostausschuss advocates the creation of a 
common economic space between Russia and the EU and has been 
very favourable to Russian WTO membership.102 E.ON, the biggest 
foreign company operating in the Russian electricity sector, has also 
welcomed tentative signs of market liberalisation.103  
 
A thorny issue is the row over the European Energy Charter, which 
aims at providing equal market access to investors. Along with other 
provisions, the charter would allow foreign oil companies to operate 
in Russia on an equal footing with national companies, breaking Gaz-
prom’s and Transneft’s monopoly on Russian gas and oil pipelines. At 
present, the Russian Strategic Sectors Law makes foreign participation 
in oil projects conditional to prior approval and limits participation to 
49%.  
 
In the words of Minister of State Cornelia Pieper, speaking at the Rus-
so–German Raw Materials Conference, ‘we naturally respect Russia’s 
wish to use its natural resources in a manner optimal to itself and Rus-
sian industry. The protection of its own market is the good right of 
every country. However, this shouldn’t lead to market distortions. In 
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the spirit of the strategic partnership between our two countries, there 
should be no market barriers’.104  
 
Although Germany is in favour of Russia ratifying the Energy Char-
ter, it is sufficiently realist to understand that Russia will not accept 
it105 as it is and is seeking to develop a bilateral dialogue with Russia. 
In a reaction analogous to Germany’s response to the Russian pro-
posal for a pan-European Security Treaty, which we will discuss later, 
former President Medvedev’s alternative proposal for a European En-
ergy Codex has therefore not been dismissed out of hand.106  
 
A working group of the German–Russian Raw Materials Conference 
is seeking to develop common positions. Edmund Stoiber, explains 
that ‘the focus currently is the question of whether and how a revised 
Energy Charter, enriched with elements of the Russian proposal for an 
Energy Codex, could be a basis for further cooperation’.107  
 
Interestingly, in conversations with Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg of 
Norway, another country which is not bound by the Energy Charter – 
a point Russia has never failed to underline – Chancellor Angela Mer-
kel is reported to have told her Norwegian colleague that the Russian 
proposal ‘contains many good elements on which we could build 
on’.108 
De-securitisation of energy policy 
Germany’s chief concerns are to open up Russia for foreign invest-
ment in the energy sector so as to maintain sufficiently high levels of 
production, and to strengthen mutual dependency by encouraging joint 
participation. However, Germany does not want to have to bear the 
political and economic costs of what it deems an unreasonable securit-
isation of energy issues – and it has successfully promoted this ap-
proach.   
 
In view of Germany’s general assessment of the low threat potential 
of Russia using ‘energy as a weapon’, Berlin’s opposition (along with 
that of Paris) to the inclusion of energy security in NATO’s new stra-
tegic concept should not come as a surprise. The idea of an ‘Energy 
NATO’ originated in 2006, after the first Russo–Ukrainian gas con-
                                                 
104  http://www.rohstoff-
forum.org/content/images/3_rohstoff_konferenz/vortraege/RohstoffKonferenz_Redebeit
ragAA_StMinPieper_Protokollfassung.pdf. 
105  Putin had previously described the Charter as ‘an unserious document’ 
106  ‘Berlin sucht Energie-Dialog mit Russland’, Handelsblatt.com, 13 May 2009. 
http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/berlin-sucht-energie-dialog-mit-
russland/3175686.html (accessed 2 June 2013) 
107  Rohstoff-forum.org. Accessed 2 June 2013 
108  Supra 115. 
Germany in the New Europe      45 
 
45 
flict, when Poland took the initiative to promote a ‘European energy 
security treaty’. In the run-up to NATO’s new strategy concept, which 
was adopted in Lisbon in November 2010, US Secretary of State Hil-
lary Clinton urged that energy security should be made one of 
NATO’s top future priorities. In her strategic concept speech in Feb-
ruary 2010, she argued that ‘threats to our networks and infrastructure 
such as cyber-attacks and energy disruptions’ should be considered an 
Article 5 action, in which an attack on one NATO member is an attack 
on all.109  
 
In a speech detailing Germany’s official position, Minister of State in 
the Foreign Ministry Werner Hoyer, encouraged NATO to embark ‘on 
a more sober and pragmatic relationship with Russia’, and then went 
on to explain: ‘we should cautiously examine the implications of con-
sidering Article 5 in connection with new threats and challenges, such 
as cyber-attacks’– thereby dismissing possible energy disruptions as 
an Article 5 matter.110 
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From front-line state to bridge-builder 
The initiative to turn energy disruptions into an Article 5 matter seems 
to have been effectively buried even before the Lisbon summit. 
Helped by a relaxation of tensions on the energy market, due to not 
least to the exploitation of shale gas in in the USA, Germany has suc-
cessfully worked for de-securitising energy policy in Europe. Of equal 
interest is how Russia and Germany have also been at the forefront of 
security policy initiatives aimed at each other. While remaining loyal 
to its NATO obligations, Germany has responded favourably, but in 
an uncommitted manner, to a series of Russian initiatives. Without 
seriously compromising its NATO commitments, Germany has also 
sought to build bridges and partnerships with Russia 
 
Germany spent the post-war period at the front-line of the Cold War. 
Officially, Berlin dismisses Russia’s main argument against NATO 
expansion, which sees the positioning of military capabilities in the 
vicinity of Russia’s borders as constituting a threat. Official rhetoric 
aside, Berlin’s historical experience as a front-line state makes the 
Kremlin’s argument more credible in German eyes than in those of 
other countries. Germany has no intentions of being drawn into a new 
Cold War under any circumstances. This has implications for the fu-
ture of both NATO–German  and US–German relations. 
 
Again, we should recall that present-day German and Russian initia-
tives have Cold War roots. Back in 1967, Belgian foreign minister 
Pierre Harmel submitted a report to NATO, ‘Future Tasks of the Alli-
ance’,111 which advocated improved diplomatic relations with Com-
munist states – the starting point of the process that was to lead up to 
the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. The Harmel Report has 
often been quoted by German politicians on all sides of the political 
spectrum favourable to détente and rapprochement. Two influential 
foreign policy-makers, Egon Bahr and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, both 
believed NATO was destined to disappear at the end of the Cold War, 
to be replaced by a common European security system. On the Soviet 
side, the ‘Germanist’ diplomats in charge of Moscow treaty negotia-
tions in 1970 even envisaged that the treaties would pave the way for 
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a future geo-strategic partnership between Germany and Russia.112 
Subsequent events were to prove that German and Russian NATO-
sceptics alike underestimated the alliance’s capacity to reform itself 
and find new purpose in the post-Cold War world. What NATO has 
lacked in terms of identity has been counterbalanced by efficiency. 
 
For a short while, it seemed as if Russia could be integrated into the 
European security system. As noted by Vincent Pouliot, ‘in its first 
years as an independent country, Russia enthusiastically embraced the 
internal mode of pursuing security even to the point of supporting 
NATO’s transformation in that direction’.113 In the final months of its 
existence, the USSR supported the Gulf War and apparently embraced 
Bush Sr.’s vision of ‘a new world order’. In December 1991, Yeltsin 
wrote a letter declaring his country’s readiness to examine the issue of 
Russia’s membership of NATO in the long run. However, no answer 
ever came.114  
 
Instead of re-founding the European security system, NATO policy-
makers reaped the benefits of the stabilisation dividend through an 
eastward expansion of the alliance. Starting in 1993, German defence 
minister Volker Rühe, battling a lukewarm Kohl and a reticent 
Genscher, became one of the earliest and most vocal advocates of 
eastern expansion, which became the position defended by Germany 
at the NATO Travemünde summit in 1993. 
 
Volker Rühe’s unequivocal commitment to eastward expansion was 
commensurate with his rebuttal of Russia: ‘Russia cannot be integrat-
ed into either the European Union or in NATO… if Russia were to 
become member of NATO it would blow NATO apart… It would be 
like the United Nations of Europe – it wouldn’t work.’115  
 
NATO’s announcement on 1 December 1994 to proceed with en-
largement took the Russians by surprise. Yeltsin’s ‘cold peace’ speech 
in Budapest echoes with Putin’s Munich speech on new dividing lines 
in Europe in 2007. In the words of Yeltsin: ‘Europe has not yet freed 
itself from the heritage of the Cold War and is in danger of plunging 
into a Cold Peace. Why sow the seeds of mistrust?’116  
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There were voices in Germany receptive to Yeltsin, not least amongst 
the older generation. In 1997, at the threshold of NATO’s eastward 
expansion, a sceptical Genscher warned against the absence of pro-
posals for a ‘pan-European stability order’ and asked for a European 
security council under the aegis of the OSCE.117  
 
The breaking point came with the Yugoslav wars and the eastward 
expansion of NATO. Since then, Russia has consistently argued that 
the principle of indivisible, mutual and cooperative security – the ba-
sis of the OSCE Charter, the Paris Declaration, the 2+4 Agreement 
and the UN Charter itself – has been set aside. 
 
For Germany, the constant challenge has remained how to reconcile 
transatlantic commitments with overtures to Russia. At the 1999 Mu-
nich security conference, newly elected chancellor Gerhard Schröder 
stated: ‘The transatlantic partnership and the presence of the United 
States in Europe remain a guarantee also in the future for security and 
stability on our continent. But as clear as it may be: it is just as clear 
that a European security architecture without the participation of Rus-
sia is unthinkable.’118  
 
Germany has often been an advocate of Russian viewpoints inside 
NATO and has invested considerable energy in mending fences with 
Moscow after spats. Likewise, Merkel and her successive foreign min-
isters Steinmeier and Westerwelle have always opposed granting the 
NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia and Ukraine. 
However, there have been considerable nuances in communication. 
Whereas Steinmeier had few qualms about repeating the Russian ar-
gument that NATO expansion should not take place at the expense of 
Russia, Merkel, who finds Putin and Saakashvili equally unappealing, 
has preferred the more convenient smokescreen of formalist and pro-
cedural argumentation. Shortly before the 2008 Bucharest summit, she 
declared that ‘countries that are directly involved in regional conflicts 
cannot, in my opinion, become members of NATO.’119   
 
In 2005, during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Germany main-
tained a policy of silent neutrality,120 in marked contrast to the Polish 
or Swedish agenda. In response to a question from a Ukrainian jour-
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nalist on the country’s recent decision to revert to an official policy of 
neutrality, the German ambassador to Ukraine declared: ‘the steps of 
the new Ukrainian leadership do not surprise us, because we believe 
that an improved relationship with Russia is advantageous to the situa-
tion in Europe.’121 
 
The argument of democratic governance can serve vicarious motives. 
On the one hand, the treatment of imprisoned Ukrainian opposition 
leader Julia Timoshenko reportedly led Angela Merkel to instruct her 
ministers not to attend the Euro 2012 football championship.122 On the 
other hand, the Yanukovych government’s policy of neutrality suits 
Germany perfectly, since any talk of Ukrainian membership in NATO 
can now be conveniently dismissed by invoking respect for democrat-
ic decisions. In passing, it should also be noted that Germany thereby 
avoids any possible antagonising of Russia. Similarly, the increasingly 
authoritarian turn in Georgia has made it easier for Germany to op-
pose NATO membership for Georgia. 
 
From a German point of view, incorporating Georgia and Ukraine into 
the alliance would not serve to increase European security. As stated 
by George Friedman, ‘from a military standpoint, NATO membership 
for the two former Soviet republics is an empty gesture, while from a 
political standpoint, Berlin sees it as designed to irritate the Russians 
for no clear purpose’.123 Unlike Central and Eastern Europe, European 
integration would have to follow the road of EU membership – a dis-
tant and unlikely scenario, but one in which Germany, through its 
economic influence, will play a central role.   
 
There is strong consensus on not jeopardising relations with Russia, 
but an excessively accommodating attitude towards Moscow runs the 
risk of antagonising Germany’s East European partners and endanger-
ing the prospects for a broader Euro-Atlantic rapprochement with 
Russia. The 2008 Russo–Georgian War was a delicate test case that 
required a balancing act for German diplomacy.  
Germany and the Russo–Georgian war of 2008 
Before the smoke had lifted from the battlefield, historian and former 
State Department official Robert Kagan, a prominent US neocon-
servative, wrote an emphatic article in The Washington Post, arguing 
that, with respect to Russia, ‘Historians will come to view August 8, 
2008, as a turning point no less significant than November 9, 1989, 
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when the Berlin Wall fell.’124 In retrospect, we may conclude that Ka-
gan was wrong. In the case of Germany, instead of provoking a rup-
ture, the August 2008 war ultimately cemented Germany’s pragmatic 
Russia policy. 
 
A parallel can be drawn between 2008 and German reactions to the 
outbreak of the first war in Chechnya in 1994. President Yeltsin’s de-
cision to opt for a military solution in December 1994 came right after 
the agreement on the interim Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
and in the midst of delicate negotiations with Russia on membership 
in the Council of Europe.125 Just like Kohl and Genscher were essen-
tial in securing Russian membership of Europe’s human rights watch-
dog, Merkel and Steinmeier ensured the NRC resumed talks and the 
EU–Russian agenda got back on track as fast as possible.  
 
At the outbreak of hostilities, Merkel, who had opposed Georgian 
NATO membership only months before at the Bucharest summit, took 
the world by surprise after a meeting with Saakashvili in Tbilisi on 15 
August, and announced: ‘we are clearly on track for a NATO mem-
bership’. However, the spell of the Georgian leader’s charisma proved 
short-lived. After meeting with Medvedev in Sochi on 17 August, 
Merkel instead chose to describe the Russian intervention only as 
‘disproportionate’.126 Under pressure to use German influence, but 
more than willing to leave centre-stage to Sarkozy’s mediation, Mer-
kel finally called for a regional conference without Moscow’s partici-
pation – which never materialized. Merkel’s positions, particularly her 
intention to move ahead on Georgia’s membership in NATO, were 
met with sharp criticism from her own ranks. 
 
Andreas Schockenhoff , the deputy chairman of the CDU/CSU par-
liamentary group, Angela Merkel’s own party, strictly rejected grant-
ing candidate status to Georgia on three grounds: first, awarding MAP 
would amount to ‘rewarding Georgia’s rather dubious behaviour’. 
Second, it would be tantamount to ‘breaking with the enlargement 
strategy’ of NATO, because this enlargement should not be directed 
against Russia. Finally, he asked if NATO would be ready to step in, 
should Russia launch another campaign against Georgia. The SPD 
was even more openly critical to the Georgian president. SPD Parlia-
mentarian Niels Annen was ‘totally opposed to including the country 
in NATO’ so as not to turn the organisation into an ‘executive organ 
for American escalation policies’ and added: ‘we don’t want to mobi-
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lise German soldiers to save Mr Saakashvili during his next adven-
ture’.127   
 
Although Foreign Minister Steinmeier warned Russia of ‘crossing the 
Rubicon’ and remained adamant on the principle of territorial integri-
ty, he refused to take a stance on the question of responsibilities and 
never changed his scepticism towards Georgian NATO membership. 
One day after Merkel’s meeting with Saakashvili, Steinmeier warned 
against ‘quick shots, for example, by freezing negotiations over a 
partnership and cooperation agreement’ and explained that Russian 
membership in WTO and the dialogue in the NATO–Russia Council 
remained indispensable.128  
 
The present foreign minister Westerwelle, then leading opposition 
figure, was very much in line with Steinmeier’s position: ‘Georgia’s 
military intervention into South Ossetia is just as much to be criticised 
as Russia’s overreaction. We should not revert to the rhetoric of the 
Cold War.’129  
 
After some initial days of confusion, also the German media presented 
a view of the 2008 conflict markedly different from mainstream Eng-
lish-language media. Whereas The Economist ran a front-page article 
titled ‘Russia resurgent – and how the West should respond’, which 
depicted Putin towering over parading troops,130 the German Der 
Spiegel ran a front-page article titled ‘the cold warrior’ featuring a pic-
ture of US presidential candidate John McCain.131  
 
Even more remarkable were the reactions of former chancellors 
Schmidt and Schröder: according to Schröder, the ‘triggering mo-
ment’ of the war was the ‘entry of the Georgians into South Ossetia’ 
and the Georgian president was a ‘gambler’. Schröder declared him-
self ‘fully confident’ that Russia was not pursuing a policy of annexa-
tion and did not see that the latest events should give any reason to 
abandon the concept of a ‘strategic partnership’.132  
 
Egon Bahr also summed up the German consensus and criticised Mer-
kel’s declarations in Tbilisi, explaining that Georgian NATO member-
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ship would present a risk for the alliance: ‘We cannot risk that Saa-
kashvili might again proceed in his customary fashion and that we 
should then help him against Russia. That is adventurism.’133  
 
In his book NATO Toschka RU,134 Russia’s hawkish former NATO 
ambassador Dmitry Rogozin hints at ties between the Russian and 
German military. In particular, he seems to have been well informed 
about the debriefing on the Russo–Georgian War given by the German 
military to its political leadership in Berlin, which he and the Russian 
leaders in Moscow regard as objective – contrasting it favourably with 
the position taken by many other NATO members.135 While objectivi-
ty is not Rogozin’s strongest side, his testimonial seems to indicate the 
existence of informal channels between Germany and Russia at a 
point when NATO–Russia relations were officially frozen. It is also 
worth noting that the German military seems to have known at an ear-
ly stage that Russian armoured units did not proceed through the Roki 
tunnel into South Ossetia before the Georgian assault on Tskhinvali – 
a key element of the official Georgian position which was subsequent-
ly called into question by an article in the NYT.136  
 
WikiLeaks documents also testify to Germany’s delicate position dur-
ing and in the aftermath of the August 2008 war. Released US diplo-
matic cables show that the resumption of meetings in the NATO–
Russia Council, at the behest of Germany and France, came about on-
ly after a trade-off with the Baltic states and Poland, the latter request-
ing contingency plans to defend the Baltic states against a Russian in-
vasion. Germany, aware that normal relations with Russia would not 
be resumed unless the Baltic states were provided with military guar-
antees, led the diplomatic efforts to strike a compromise with the 
Eastern member states. Finally, codename ‘Eagle Guardian’, NATO’s 
secret defence plan to protect Poland against a Russian attack, were 
expanded to include the Baltic states. The plan, which was to remain 
top secret, was adopted by the NATO military council on 22 January 
2009.137 This course of action once more makes clear the German stra-
tegic dilemma within the NATO framework: the impossibility of 
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building cooperative security with Russia without at the same time 
providing collective defence guarantees to its allies.  
 
Ultimately, the 2008 war cemented Germany’s view that a new wave 
of NATO expansion into former Soviet republics would pose a threat 
to stability in Europe. Insightful observers have therefore called 
NATO’s 2012 Chicago summit the ‘non-enlargement summit’138 and 
noted that none of the aspiring countries could take home news of any 
tangible progress on the road to membership.  
A place for Russia in the European security architecture? 
The Russian proposal for a new European security pact has received 
considerable attention in Germany. The idea of a legally binding new 
security treaty, a ‘Helsinki Two’ (referring to the 1975 Helsinki 
agreement), was first announced by President Medvedev at a bilateral 
summit in Berlin on 5 June 2008. The initial draft of the new treaty 
was circulated over a year later. According to the Russian president, it 
would address the need for ‘precise, workable mechanisms for the re-
alisation of the principle of indivisible security.’139 Its numerous crit-
ics, however, have denounced the security pact as a lure which would 
effectively grant Russia a veto over NATO operations and halt any 
prospects for further EU and NATO enlargement to former Soviet 
countries.   
 
Here we should recall that as a precondition for the 2+4 agreement in 
1990, Germany’s foreign minister Genscher  ‘unequivocally’ vowed 
that there would be ‘no eastward expansion of NATO towards the 
borders of the Soviet Union’.140 However, the pressure from former 
Warsaw Pact countries and the stability gains that would accrue from 
NATO expansion proved impossible to resist. German defence minis-
ter Volker Rühe emerged as one of its earliest advocates, thereby cre-
ating a point of lasting contention between Russia and the West.141 
Under these circumstances, Kohl did his utmost to reassure his Rus-
sian partners, without being committal. At a press conference in Mos-
cow shortly before the first wave of expansions, he declared:  
 
I have made it equally clear that it is not in our interest and certainly not in mine 
to open new conflict lines in Europe, but that for me a NATO expansion must go 
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hand in hand with a close system of understanding with our Russian neighbours 
and friends, so that your legitimate security interests are assured.142  
 
For these reasons, Germany could not dismiss the Russian call for a 
new security architecture in Europe out of hand. In a response remi-
niscent of the reaction to the Russian energy codex initiative, Berlin 
responded positively, but made sure to specify that existing institu-
tions – NATO and the OSCE – would remain the cornerstone of Eu-
ropean security. The German response can be read in Steinmeier’s 
open letter to president-elect Barack Obama, urging him to ‘[...] take 
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev at his word…Today, we need a 
new basic understanding regarding the alliance’s future alignment – 
something like a new Harmel Report with which NATO gave itself a 
new orientation 40 years ago in a critical phase.’143 
 
Some vocal security politicians were willing to go much further and 
warm up old speculations on offering NATO membership to Russia. 
The realignment of Volker Rühe, the leading German architect of 
NATO’s eastward expansion and free-talking former CDU defence 
minister, is indeed remarkable. In an article co-signed by none other 
than Dmitrij Rogozin, Rühe speaks of Medvedev’s proposal as a 
‘window of opportunity’, reawakens Gorbachev’s idea of a ‘common 
European home’ and advocates setting in motion a process for ‘creat-
ing the conditions for a complete membership of Russia in NATO 
with all rights and duties’. According to the authors, NATO has no 
vital interests to defend in the Caucasus – defining security as protec-
tion against Russia runs contrary to Germany’s interests, and ‘NATO 
can solve none of its current missions without or [against] Russia. Fi-
nally, lasting and hopefully eternal peace in Europe is possible only on 
the basis of undivided security, which again sets the precondition for 
the modernisation of Russia and prosperity for Europe.’144   
 
To prove that he is not a ‘loose cannon’, Volker Rühe co-signed an-
other article, now in Der Spiegel, titled ‘opening the door’ with Klaus 
Naumann, a retired German general and government advisor, who 
headed the NATO Military Council during the Kosovo war. 145 The 
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two authors regret what they see as a German ‘fear of debate’ and 
proceed to a geopolitical justification for Russian membership in the 
Atlantic alliance with a thinly veiled allusion to China: ‘The multipo-
lar world constellation requires striking a balance with the political-
economic-strategic dynamics of the great Asian powers.’ Rühe and 
Naumann conclude that ‘Russian membership in the Atlantic alliance 
would be the logical conclusion of the Euro-Atlantic order, in which 
NATO would remain the sustaining security institution.’  
 
Rühe’s argument for NATO’s expansion to Russia now is the same as 
his argument for Eastern expansion was back in 1993: it would seal 
the alliance’s mutation into a ‘security community’ and provide an 
‘expansion of stability’.  
 
It is difficult to judge the sincerity of such initiatives, where excessive 
German goodwill competes with hollow grandstanding from the Rus-
sian side. Given that replacement of NATO and the OSCE by a new 
institutional framework is only a remote theoretical possibility and 
since institutional entry into NATO from the Russian side remain 
highly unlikely, the potential prospects for a third way must be con-
sidered. Any rapprochement between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic 
structures is bound to pass through Berlin. The Russian embassy in 
Berlin and the liberal Friedrich Neumann Foundation have initiated a 
joint ‘security policy discourse’ aimed at exploring ‘the perspectives 
for a strategic partnership between NATO and Russia’.146 The first of 
these debates was organised with the participation of Rühe and Nau-
mann as well as Rogozin. In a follow-up debate on 7 July 2011, State 
Secretary in the Foreign Ministry, Werner Hoyer, paid at least lip ser-
vice to Rühe and Naumann by stating in his speech: ‘Russia will never 
knock at the Alliance’s door, but if NATO invites Russia to join, it 
will be difficult to decline.’147  
 
If anything, the security policy discourses of the Neumann Foundation 
show that German policy-makers realise that NATO’s Russia policy 
cannot be shaped without Berlin. The question, then, must be to which 
extent Germany can actively shape NATO policy. German perspec-
tives on NATO’s new strategic concept, which was adopted in Lisbon 
in November 2010, can shed further light upon this question. 
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German perspectives on NATO’s new security concept 
The German position was fleshed out by State Secretary Werner 
Hoyer at the NATO Strategic Review Conference held at the German 
Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in September 
2010. Here he insisted that NATO should be ‘more than a defence al-
liance’, and instead a platform for building cooperative security with 
Russia. Hoyer opened his speech by asking ‘How much article 5 (the 
‘an attack on one is an attack on all’), does NATO need?’148  
 
While stressing German commitment to this fundamental NATO prin-
ciple, Hoyer ‘agreed to disagree’: ‘Given political geography and the 
different historical experiences of NATO members, it is understanda-
ble and legitimate that Allies differ with regard to their need for reas-
surance.’ He went on to explain that ‘reassurance and cooperative se-
curity with Russia go hand in hand.’ Hoyer was in fact restating the 
compromise which had already been reached in June 2010 by the 
NATO expert group headed by former US Secretary of State Made-
leine Albright – bringing Germany back to its contradictions.  
 
One of the expert group’s critics was Ambassador Ischinger, the Ger-
man head of the Munich security conference. In an op-ed to the NYT, 
he wrote:  
 
The expert group attempts to bridge the differences by proposing to reach out to 
Russia but under the condition that any constructive engagement would have to 
be based on military reassurances within NATO. This means that defence plan-
ning activities – against Russia – would continue to be on the alliance agenda. 
But how can the view expressed in the very same report – that NATO is not a 
threat to Russia, nor Russia to NATO – be reconciled with continuous defence 
planning activities against Russia?149  
 
The Ambassador concludes that the expert group did not offer a real 
strategic response to Dmitri Medvedev’s proposals on European secu-
rity – a very predictable outcome.  
 
At the behest of France and Germany, Russia was granted observer 
status at the Lisbon summit – a significant symbolic novelty, but still 
only symbolic. In the ensuing NATO–Russia joint declaration, NATO 
and Russia formally agreed not to consider each other as threats, to 
cooperate in Afghanistan and to resume discussions on missile de-
fence.150 On 6 February 2011, the new Treaty on Strategic Arms Re-
ductions (START) entered into force after Presidents Obama and 
Medvedev exchanged their instruments of ratification at the Munich 
security conference, at least paying a symbolic geographical tribute to 
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Germany’s bridge-building efforts. Shortly after the signing, the agen-
da of the US–Russian ‘reset’ quickly ground to a halt without Germa-
ny being able to weigh in. The summit agreement to pursue talks on 
missile defence would prove to be an agreement to disagree. 
The quest for a European security architecture: squaring the 
circle? 
The NATO summit demonstrated that Germany was incapable of 
gaining acceptance for many of the ambitions which had been pro-
moted by liberal democrats in the FDP during the 2009 electoral cam-
paign. Three objectives were fleshed out and included in the Novem-
ber 2009 coalition agreement: the removal of US tactical nuclear 
weapons from German soil, making any NATO out-of-area operations 
conditional on a UN Security Council mandate,151 and a commitment 
to general disarmament.152  
 
Knowing in advance that getting any NATO out-of-area operations 
made conditional on a UN mandate and changing the Washington 
Treaty accordingly would fail, in his aforementioned position speech, 
Werner Hoyer restricted himself to repeating that ‘the Alliance must 
be committed to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and to 
international law. And we should say so in the new strategic con-
cept.’153 Since the reference to the UN Charter is already included in 
the Washington Treaty, this amounts to little more than symbolic poli-
cy. Similarly, and even though the NATO expert report did mention a 
tightened nuclear arms control regime, and although the German gov-
ernment had lauded NATO Secretary-General Fogh Rasmussen’s 
mention of nuclear disarmament as part of his plan for NATO’s future 
as a ‘great breakthrough’, the strategic concept adopted in Lisbon con-
tains no concrete proposals to this effect.154  
 
Concerning the 30-odd US nuclear warheads thought to be stationed at 
the Bochum military airbase in North Rhine-Westphalia, the US nu-
clear posture review revealed in May 2010 flatly dismisses any idea of 
a pull-out. This is despite the US commission of experts who conclud-
ed that the weapons were ‘militarily worthless’. The document instead 
states that nuclear weapons ‘contribute to alliance cohesion’ and thus 
have a political value as part of the ‘transatlantic link’ that Washing-
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ton clearly does not want to relinquish.155  During the 2009 electoral 
campaign, Merkel herself had argued in favour of pulling out the US 
warheads, but the Atlanticists in the CDU-led defence ministry quick-
ly backtracked and reaffirmed Germany’s commitment to ‘nuclear 
sharing’. Similarly, SPD and FDP foreign ministers Steinmeier and 
Westerwelle had both pursued the idea after Obama unveiled his am-
bition of a nuclear-free world, but they achieved precious little.156    
 
NATO missile defence remains the real litmus test for Germany’s de-
clared ambition of building security with Russia, not against it. At a 
preparatory meeting for the Lisbon summit held in Brussels on 14 Oc-
tober 2010, Germany finally ceded to US pressure that made public its 
support for US Defence Secretary Gates and Fogh Rasmussen’s re-
vamped NATO missile defence. We should recall that the decision to 
scrap President Bush’s ‘Missile Defence 1’ – a purely US system – 
had previously been unanimously saluted to by the German political 
class who feared unduly provoking Russia.157 In essence, the new sys-
tem proposes a merger of existing capabilities with US missiles in 
Eastern Europe.  
 
Two basic factors motivate German policy: the importance Russia 
gives to the issue, and the hostility of German public opinion nuclear 
weapons. The substance of the new German argument in favour of 
missile defence seeks to accommodate both concerns: if the parties 
could agree on joint cooperation on missile defence, then a link could 
be established between missile defence and nuclear disarmament. In 
other words, missile defence would provide leverage to facilitate dis-
armament.  
 
Against this backdrop, and quite aware of the irreconcilable view-
points of the USA and Russia, the amount of expedient optimism de-
ployed by the German political leadership seemingly knows no 
boundaries. Any signs of discussions are enthusiastically hailed as yet 
another ‘crucial breakthrough’.158 
 
Germany’s official argument that a hypothetical joint NATO–Russia 
missile defence shield could act as a confidence-building measure and 
pave the way for nuclear disarmament appears as remote from reality 
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as does the German proposal for conducting joint NATO–Russia mis-
sile defence exercises.159 At any rate, it provides yet another display of 
Germany’s fundamental ambiguity: a continued commitment to col-
lective defence within NATO, combined with a policy of engagement 
and building ‘cooperative security’ with Russia. A German govern-
ment that succeeded in solving this dilemma would be squaring the 
circle. Then again, Germany might just be quite comfortable with up-
holding its current ambiguity and status quo. 
Limits to German influence 
Berlin’s concessions on the US missile defence project in exchange 
for improbable future reductions in strategic arms stockpiles would 
seem to be an illustration of the relative powerlessness of Germany.  
 
This same reasoning essentially holds true of the US nuclear warheads 
in Germany. As long as Washington sees them as an essential part of 
the transatlantic link, Germany is essentially left to gesticulating. The 
alliance with other nuclear-free countries calling for a debate on the 
future of the US weapons has failed to provide sufficient leverage. 
 
On the other hand, as we have seen, Germany has largely succeeded in 
de-securitising energy as an issue. Here, the Friedensstaat was able to 
call upon the vested interests and influence of the Handelsstaat to en-
sure that energy security would not be turned into a NATO matter. 
Similarly, Germany managed to delay the further expansion of NATO 
by offering Georgia economic compensations in terms of market 
opening and promises of closer integration with the EU – without be-
ing accused of outright obstructionism.  
 
On Westerwelle’s trip to the Caucasus in the summer of 2012, eco-
nomic questions topped the agenda, demonstrating Georgia’s lowered 
expectations with respect to the question of NATO membership. 
Westerwelle reaffirmed Germany’s commitment to the territorial in-
tegrity of Georgia, but also encouraged the Georgian leadership to 
maintain open diplomatic channels to the breakaway republics.  
 
Similarly, in an alternative history scenario where the countries of 
Eastern and Central Europe were not yet full EU members, Germany 
could have offered additional economic integration in exchange for 
revising the missile shield plans, which might have resulted in a dif-
ferent outcome. 
 
Where a link can successfully be established between security ques-
tions and German economic interests, Germany has the potential to 
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weigh in with considerable impact. In other instances, when attempt-
ing to influence on ‘hard security’ questions without providing other 
incentives, it will usually fail, because here Germany wields limited 
influence on the decision-making of other actors. 
 
Conclusions 
With relation to Russia, we have repeatedly seen how the wording of 
problem-sets relating to German foreign, security and energy policy 
bears surprising resemblance to issues dating back to the 1960s and 
1970s and even earlier. Today’s debates echo the discussions on Gor-
bachev’s Common European Home; on Genscher’s promise for a new 
post-NATO European security architecture; on the Harmel Report, 
which set out to build a ‘an enduring and just peace arrangement for 
all of Europe’; and indeed also the 1954 Soviet proposal for an all-
European security framework agreement.  
 
These few examples show how German strategic foreign policy think-
ing, often discredited as lacking in depth and analysis, has in fact been 
drawing on a solid tradition. The main difference from other countries 
is that, in Berlin, any prospects of a new Cold War definitely ended 
with German reunification.    
 
The weight of history has created a culture of restraint in German for-
eign policy.160 This was temporarily challenged in 1999 when the new 
Red/Green government took a leading role in NATO’s first out-of-
area operation, the airstrikes on Yugoslavia. In hindsight, the Kosovo 
war stands out as a failed attempt at an interventionist-humanitarian 
redefinition of German post-war pacifism. It remains to be seen if 
German politicians will undertake such ventures in the future. The 
numerous critics of Foreign Minister Westerwelle’s decision to ‘side 
with Russia’ and abstain at the UN Security Council vote over Libya 
did not bring up humanitarian concerns, but instead focused their ar-
gumentation on the need for ‘alliance solidarity’ – another way of say-
ing stability within existing frameworks.161  
 
Some two years after the start of the Libyan civil war, it is worth re-
flecting that Westerwelle is still in office and Germany is still in 
NATO, whereas the federal president Horst Köhler, who thought that 
‘military might was sometimes justified to protect trade routes’ was 
forced out of office almost immediately, even though he had probably 
been referring only to the need to fight piracy.  
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Over Syria, German diplomacy has remained low-key. The message is 
that Germany will remain loyal to existing security organisations such 
as NATO and the OSCE, but will not be a driving force for NATO’s 
‘out-of-area’ operations or legitimising wars outside the UN frame-
work – which is precisely the essence of Russia’s diatribes against the 
West. During Putin’s visit to Berlin in May 2012, the Russian presi-
dent and German chancellor, despite substantial differences, both took 
care to display a show of unity over Syria, calling for an unlikely ‘po-
litical solution’.162 And at their meeting in Moscow in November 
2012, Syria was simply not on the agenda, so as not to highlight any 
differences between the parties.   
 
Through its rational pacifism and well-understood self-interest, Ger-
many will always encourage NATO to keep open channels to Russia. 
This attitude should not, however, be confused with equidistance or 
neutrality.  
 
The EU has so far failed to integrate the former Soviet Union into a 
larger European context. With the possible exception of Moldova, the 
debate on EU enlargement into the post-Soviet space is essentially off 
the agenda for the foreseeable future. Likewise, the only effects of EU 
sanctions have been to reinforce Belarus’s economic ties with Russia, 
thus making strategic reorientation, even in the event of regime 
change, increasingly unlikely. In this context, Germany’s bilateral re-
lations to Russia are set to remain crucial in the coming decade.  
 
It seems increasingly unlikely, however, that this will ever develop 
into a ‘special partnership’. The normative gap between the two is too 
wide, and special relationships are hard to sustain over time. Still, for 
all his strongmanship, the pro-German Putin, who looks positioned to 
remain in charge for the next decade, has also meant a chance for 
Germany. After Putin’s March 2012 election, the German Chancellor 
chose not to send an official letter of congratulations, instead wishing 
him ‘good luck’ upon his re-election. On the other hand, Angela Mer-
kel was one of the first to call him: ‘I made it clear that the strategic 
partnership, and also the modernisation partnership between Germany 
and Russia, will be pursued in very close contacts.’163  
 
As long as official Germany continues to talk of a strategic partner-
ship it is essentially validating Russian policy. Merkel’s insistence on 
human rights and dialogue with civil society is primarily aimed at a 
German audience, and will not alter the fundamentals of the relation-
ship. The present modernisation partnership is what comes closest to 
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reality. Barring any extraordinary developments, such as a US-led war 
on Iran or revolutionary change in Russia, it seems unlikely that this 
will develop into a real strategic partnership or a partnership for dem-
ocratic change. In the end, Berlin may well have understood that the 
current Moscow leadership is the best that could be hoped for – with-
out saying this out loud.   
 
In its security policy decisions, Germany has no wish to be faced with 
a radical choice, and will go to considerable lengths to avoid ending 
up in a ‘we or them’ situation. Traditionally, this meant not having to 
make a choice between the USA and France. During the Cold War, 
when Germany itself was in the front-line and was ultimately hoping 
to change the prevailing status quo, it had little alternative but to align 
with the USA as a last resort. Some 12 years later, on the eve of the 
second Iraq war, this disappeared and Germany aligned with France 
against the USA.  
 
In 2011, freshly re-elected to the Security Council, Germany went fur-
ther when it chose to cast its vote in the Security Council against both 
the USA and France. In both cases, the German government’s deci-
sion met strong domestic opposition, but had popular support. In both 
cases, prominent critics predicted that Germany’s ties to the transat-
lantic or European communities would suffer permanent damage from 
its stance in the Security Council. These predictions all proved wrong. 
In fact, the potential cost of alienating Germany is so high that it is 
hard to imagine a country willing to pay the price.  
 
For Berlin, working within, not challenging, the existing international 
order is the best way to position itself for the 21st century. Germany is 
anchored in the West, but with ever-stronger ties in the East: and no 
country, including Russia, can afford to alienate it. Likewise, partners 
and allies should know that Germany has no intentions of ever being 
placed at the front-line of a new Cold War again, nor will it accept any 
policy aimed at isolating Russia. Ultimately, Germany serves as a 
moderating element in international affairs. It may prove to be the best 
and most stable guarantee against the danger of any talk of a new Cold 
War with Russia escalating from rhetoric to reality. 
 
